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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The impressive growth of the Internet in the 1990s and the boom of the e-
economy generated a competition for the domain names in the most coveted of the top 
domain names, i.e. the .com1. Nonetheless, the other original generic top level domain 
names (gTLDs) open to commercial use, .org, and .net, were also under high demand 
from businesses2. Other types of top-level domain names, especially the country code 
TLDs (ccTLDS), were of little commercial value yet, and registration was not as 
important as in the case of gTLDs3. As a result, the artificial scarcity of TLDs created by 
the managers of the Domain Name System (DNS) sharply increased the value of the 
registered and most popular domain names. Just recently a new set of gTLDs were 
introduced in the root system4. 
Initially, the domain name system was delegated to Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), a 
private for profit firm, through a special contract with the United States government5. In 
                                                          
1 “…[T]he “Webification” of domain names was the critical step in the endowment of the name space with 
economic value. It massively increased the demand for domain name registrations and game common, or 
famous, or generic terms under the .com space the commercially valuable property of being able to 
effortlessly deliver thousands if not millions of Web site “hits”.” Milton Mueller, RULING THE ROOT. 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE. The MIT Press Cambridge, 2002, at 109. 
“The e-commerce explosion of the late 20th Century has created a rush on Internet domain names. More 
domain names are being registered, and there are more registrars to do it than ever before. In fact, the 
Internet may be running out of space. In the most popular top level domain, <.com>, it seems that almost 
every recognizable word has been claimed.” Kevin Heller, The Young Cybersquatter’s Handbook: A 
Comparative Analysis of the ICANN Dispute. 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2, at2. 
2 “Other gTLDs in existence since 1984 impose additional criteria for registration: .mil (U.S. military), .gov 
(U.S. government), .int (international organizations), .edu (institutions of higher education, mostly U.S. 
based), and .arpa. In November 2000, following a complex and convoluted process, ICANN approved in 
principle the creation of seven new gTLDs.” A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy” Causes and (Partial) Cures. 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, at 618. 
“Domain names have become the valuable intangible real estate of cyberspace. For example, the domain 
name sex.com was valued at $250 million; business.com at $7.5 million; and loan.com at $3.0 million. The 
monetary value of some domain names suggests that it would be proper to classify domain names as 
property.” Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble with Domain 
Name Classification. 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, at 184-85. 
3 See, Froomkin, supra note 2, at 618. 
4 “Among the most significant events in the domain name world is the addition of seven new generic top 
level domain names (“gtlds”): .aero; .biz; .coop; .info; .museum; .name; and .pro. The .info name like .com 
before it, is unrestricted and anyone will be able to register and use it. The other domain names have 
restricted uses.” Barbara Solomon, Domain Name Disputes: New Developments and Open Issues. 91 
TRADEMARK REP. 833, at 833. 
5 “NSI agreed t oregister second-level domains in .com, .net, .org and .edu and to maintain those top-level 
domains’ master databases. Thise services were underwritten by the National Science Foundation and were 
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1995 NSI delineated a policy for conflict resolution of domain names, but there was no 
authority in charge of solving the disputes6. The management of numerical addresses in 
the Internet was in charge of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)7. In 1997, 
and because of the expansion of the Internet to the international sphere, the United States 
government delegated the management of numbers and names of the Internet to a non-
profit corporation based in California, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN)8. From this year on, this Corporation was in charge of the 
management of the names and numbers system for the Internet9. Even though ICANN is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
free to users initially. As the number of registrations began to rise, NSI ant the Naitonal Science Foundation 
agreed that NSF would no longer underwrite these services. Instead, NSI would charge a fifty dollars (US 
$50) annual fee to each domain name registrant.” Wayde Brooks, Wrestling Over the World Wide Web: 
ICANN’s Uniform dispute Resolution Policy for Domain Names Disputes. 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 
297, at 311-312. 
6 “In July 1995, Network Solutions issued a “Domain Dispute Resolution Policy Statement” designed to 
shield itself from future trademark-related lawsuits. In this policy statement, Network Solutions declared 
that it “has neither the legal resources nor the legal obligation to screen requested Domain Names to 
determine f the use of a Domain Name by and Applicant may infringe upon the right(s) of a third party.” It 
then set out a series of contractual conditions that would be imposed on all registrants in the InterNIC-
operated domains. The policy gave Network Solutions the right to withdraw a domain name from use if 
presented with a court order to arbitration panel decision transferring the name.” MUELLER, supra note 1, at 
120-121. 
“To invoke the NSI Dispute Policy, the complainant would have to give notice to the registrant that there 
had been an alleged trademark violation because the “creation date” of the registrant’s domain name 
registration followed the “effective date” of the complainant’s registration of an identical trademark. After 
NSI received a copy of the complaint, the registrant would have thirty days to prove that he owned a 
trademark in the contested name. If he could not, NSI would put the domain name on “hold” until a 
resolution was reached, either between the parties or through litigation.” Keith Blackman, The Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: A Cheaper Way to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics. 
15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 211, at 222. 
7 “RFC 1083 (December 1988), which defined a standards-making process for the new, extended Internet 
community, was also the first public document to mention and Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA).” MUELLER, supra note 1, at 93 (describing the creation and characteristics of IANA). 
8 See, MUELLER, supra note 1, Chapter 8 (describing the political process that resulted in the creation of 
ICANN in 1997.) 
“In the White Paper that emerged from the convoluted U.S. government policy process –formally known as 
the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Statement of Policy on Management of Interent Names and 
Addresses- the government took something of a middle-of-the-road position. It agreed that trademark 
owners were being victimized by so-called cyberpirates who registered domain names to sell them to the 
corresponding trademark holder. But rather than proposing direct action, the White Paper called on WIPO 
to conduct a study and make recommendations for what would become ICANN.” Froomkin, supra note 2, 
at 622-623. 
9 “In furtherance of the foregoing purposes, and in recognition of the fact that the Internet is an 
international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization, the Corporation 
shall, except as limited by Article 5 hereof, pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the 
burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet 
by (i)coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal 
connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the 
Internet Protocol ("IP") address space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination 
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the most important organization in the management of domain names, it is not the only 
one. There are other alternative root servers: Open NIC, ORSC, Pacific Root, New.net, 
Name.space and CN-NIC10. But as for size importance and relationship with the U.S. 
government, ICANN is the main referent in the actual structure of the Internet. 
Accordingly, the relevance and power of ICANN in enacting new policies for the Internet 
is based in two main characteristics. First, the monopoly of the main Domain Name 
system in the Internet and, second, the lack of technological compatibility between 
competing Domain Name systems, which prevented others private firms from competing 
with ICANN11. 
One of the main problems in the medium term was the creation of a system to 
handle the growing number of problems among users because of the -sometimes 
indiscriminate- registration of domain names that collided with already established 
trademarks in the real life markets12. These disputes grew at the same pace than the 
Internet commerce boomed in the late nineties13. The behavior of ICANN has been 
questioned in this respect. Instead of decreasing the pressure over the .com top domain 
name by creating other kinds of top domain names, ICANN has been accused of 
artificially creating a scarcity in this environment and driving up the demand on the 
already full .com14. Furthermore, the usual mechanism to solve these kinds of disputes, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of the Internet domain name system ("DNS"), including the development of policies for determining the 
circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing 
operation of the authoritative Internet DNS root server system; and (v) engaging in any other related lawful 
activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv).” Articles of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers, November 1998, at http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm  
10 See, MUELLER, supra note 1 at 55 (describing the other root servers of the Internet and the problems of 
compatibility between them.) 
11 Id. 
12 “Unfortunately for these businesses, registration of SLDs in the htree existent gTLDs (.com, .org and 
.net) and in the ccTLDs which emulate them, is on a first-come, first-served basis. No questions are asked 
about the proposed use, or about possible trademark conflicts. … As there was no limit to the number of 
names a person could register, name speculators quickly understood that they could register names and 
seek buyers for them without risking any capital. While some speculators sought common words with 
multiple possible uses, a few others –who became known as cybersquatters- registered thousands of names 
that corresponded to the trademarks or companies that had not yet found the Internet and then sought to 
resell (or, some would say, ransom) the name to those companies.” Froomkin, supra note 2, at 620. 
13 “Whether the actual magnitude of the overall “cyber-piracy” problem was .045% or 3.5% of new 
registrations, or more likely somewhere in between, and whether the problem was growing or shrinking, in 
absolute terms, it clearly existed.” Froomkin, supra note 2, at 627. 
14 See, Heller, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
Even though there were just three gTLDs open to general public, IANA registered more than 200 
applications until 1996. See, MUELLER, supra note 1, at 132-133. 
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i.e., courts, were handicapped to handle cases in which parties come from different 
jurisdictions and laws, and even though the Courts could establish a verdict, the 
enforcement was weak, if possible at all15. Furthermore, usual judicial remedies are too 
slow and quite expensive for the Internet domain name disputes16. Accordingly, one of 
the main tasks of ICANN -in concordance with the mandate received through the 
delegation of powers from the United States government- was to provide a system to 
solve the domain name disputes17. In 1999, after a series of consultations with many 
interest groups, ICANN created the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)18. This 
                                                          
15 “The global reach of the Internet provides both the Internet’s appeal and many of the legal problems 
being encountered. Activity on the web that may be permissible where initiated may violate the law in the 
locale where the web site is accessed. Until recently there was no easy way to confine modifications to a 
web site or domain name to a particular geographic area. This, any changes tat were made or imposed by a 
court became global in effect even when made in response to local laws or requirements.” Solomon, supra 
note 4, at 859. 
“Many of these multijurisdictional disputes raise exactly the kinds of issues typically found in U.S. 
litigation involving citizens of more than one state, such as differences in substantive law, procedural rules, 
and choice of law rules. As the disputes move from interstate to international, the differences and practical 
difficulties increase. Difference in substantial law may be more substantial, differences in procedural rules 
more significant, differences in the ability to acquire jurisdiction more diverse, and differences in choice of 
law rules more complex. Also, multinational disputes can add a layer of enforcement difficulties.” 
Elizabeth Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 191, at 192-193. 
See, Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1275 (analyzing the 
problems of the courts in handling cases related to the Internet.) 
16 “Notwithstanding the size of the individual settlements, firms managing large number of brands argued 
that the cumulative costs imposed an unfair burden and amounted to a windfall to the undeserving. Worse, 
aggrieved trademark holders in countries with dysfunctional court systems stated that their national court 
systems were so slow as to make the wait for meaningful relief against improper domain name registrations 
an eternity in Internet time, or even in ordinary time. Other trademark holders complained of the difficulty 
of locating cybersquatters who falsified their contact information at the time of registration, or who were 
located in jurisdictions where the law was uncertain, the courts unreliable, or service was difficult.” 
Froomkin, supra note 2, at 629. 
17 “The U.S. Government will seek international support to call upon the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) to initiate a balanced and transparent process, which includes the participation of 
trademark holders and members of the Internet community who are not trademark holders, to (1) develop 
recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark/domain name disputes involving 
cyberpiracy (as opposed to conflicts between trademark holders with legitimate competing rights), (2) 
recommend a process for protecting famous trademarks in the generic top level domains, and (3) evaluate 
the effects, based on studies conducted by independent organizations, such as the National Research 
Council of the National Academy of Sciences, of adding new gTLDs and related dispute resolution 
procedures on trademark and intellectual property holders. These findings and recommendations could be 
submitted to the board of the new corporation for its consideration in conjunction with its development of 
registry and registrar policy and the creation and introduction of new gTLDs.” United States Department of 
Commerce, Management of Internet Names and Addresses, June 1998, at 
http://www.icann.org/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm  
18 “The UDRP was adopted to provide a relatively fast and effective means of dealing with the issues of 
bad faith domain name registration. Currently. The UDRP applies to the .com, .net, and .org gtlds and top 
sixteen cctlds. Moreover, there is a push for all cctld registrars to adopt a policy modeled on the UDRP. If 
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system was thought as a decentralized regime for dispute resolution in which ICANN 
created the general rules and a series of competing private providers were authorized to 
manage and resolve disputes. Finally, ICANN, because of its role as the only manager of 
the domain name system, could exert and almost perfect enforcement of the providers’ 
decisions19. Theoretically, the system seemed to work perfectly. Nonetheless, after a few 
years from its creation, the regime has been subject to hard criticism from scholars and 
commentators. The debate on the performance of the system has been strong, with both 
favorable and unfavorable comments20. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
all domain registrars were to adopt the same policy, a complainant could bring a consolidated action 
concerning objectionable domain names in both gtlds and cctlds. WIPO has received four such cases.” 
Solomon, supra note 4, at 835. 
19 “Under the UDRP, jurisdiction is contractual. The UDRP is incorporated into every domain name 
Registration Agreement. By registering a domain name with any accredited registrar, if any third party 
alleges cybersquatting, respondent subjects himself to the UDRP’s mandatory administrative procedure 
which is in procedural compliance with the Rules.” Heller, supra note 1, at 4. 
20 There is a wide range of critics and some support of the UDRP by ICANN. The following is an 
incomplete list of some papers that deal with the problems and challenges of the system: Laurence R. 
Helfer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy. 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (October 2001), at 154-155; Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Fast, Cheap and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process. 6 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 191 (Spring 2002); Patrick D. Kelley, Emerging Patterns in Arbitration 
Under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy. 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 181 (2002); Adam 
Goldstein, ICANNSUCKS.BIZ (And Why You Can’t Say That): How Fair Use of Trademarks in Domain 
Names is Being Restrained. 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1151 (Spring 2002); Milton 
Mueller, A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark Disputes under ICANN’s UDRP. Syracuse University 
School of Information Studies Working Paper, June 2002 (On file with the authors); Milton Mueller, 
Ruling the Root. Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England, 2002; Scott Hejny, Opening the Door to Controversy: How Recent 
ICANN Decisions Have Muddied the Waters of Domain Name Dispute Resolution. 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1037 
(Fall 2001); Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: A Cheaper Way to 
Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics. 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 211 (Fall 2001); Pamela Segal, 
Attempts to Solve the UDRP’s Trademark Holder Bias: A Problem That Remains Unsolved Despite the 
Introduction of New Top Level Domain Names. 3 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (December 
2001); Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Invalidity of ICANN’s UDRP Under National Law. 3 MINN. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 1 (2002); Michael Geist, Fair.com? An Examination of the allegations of systemic Unfairness 
in the ICANN UDRP. 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903 (2002); Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: 
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution. 50 DUKE L. J. 17 (October 2000); Joe Sims 
and Cynthia Bauerly, A Response to Professor Froomkin: Why ICANN Does Not Violate The APA or The 
Constitution. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 65 (Spring 2002); Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance 
in Cyberspace. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93 (Spring 2002); Joe Sims and Cynthia L. Bauerly, A 
Reply to Professor Froomkin’s Form and Substance in Cyberspace. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 125 
(Spring 2002); Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy” –Causes and (Partial) 
Cures. 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (Spring 2002); David H. Bernstein, The Alphabet Soup of domain Name 
Dispute Resolution: The UDRP and ACPA. 716 PLI/PAT 251 (2002); Richard E. Speidel, ICANN Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Limitations of Modern Arbitration 
Law. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 167 (Spring 2002); Stephen J. Ware, Domain Name Arbitration in 
the Arbitration-Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 129 
(Spring 2002); Joe Sims and Cynthia Bauerly, A Response to Professor Froomkin: Why ICANN Does Not 
Violate the APA or the Constitution. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 65 (Spring 2002); Jeffrey J. Look, 
Law and Order on the Wild, Wild West (WWW). 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 817 (Summer 2002); 
David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions. 18 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 35 (December 2001); Lisa M. Sharrock, The Future of Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution: Crafting Practical International Legal Solutions From Within the UDRP Framework. 
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Most of the empirical studies of the UDRP have been based on the analysis of 
cases handled by the providers, and the results coming from the panels’ decisions21. The 
most common critiques are that the providers have incentives to favor the complainants 
and that the rules have been designed to favor proprietary interests in the Internet22. Some 
of these facts have a reason to be because of the political structure of ICANN, which we 
have analyzed elsewhere23. In this paper, we present a thorough empirical study of the 
performance of the UDRP providers. We identify the main variables that determine the 
efficiency of the system. One of the key variables is the duration of the procedure to 
decide the cases, which has been one of the main concerns of ICANN regarding the 
UDRP24. We analyze the decisions of the complainants in deciding to send their claim to 
a provider. Using multinomial logit regression model to determine if complainants select 
                                                                                                                                                                             
51 DUKE L. J. 817 (November 2001); Wayde Brooks, Wrestling Over the World Wide Web: ICANN’s 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for Domain Name Disputes. 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 297 
(Spring 2001); Stacy King, The “Law That It Deems Applicable”: ICANN Dispute Resolution, and the 
Problem of Cybersquatting. 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. (Spring Summer 2000); Christopher Rains, A 
Domain By Any Other Name: Forging International Solutions for the Governance of Internet Domain 
Names. 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 355 (Spring 2000); Stephen Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the 
Arbitration-Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 129 
(Spring 2002); Edward Brunet, Defending Commerce’s Contract Delegation of power to ICANN. 6 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (Spring 2002); Kathleen Fuller, ICANN: The Debate Over Governing the 
Internet. 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2 (February 2001); Leah Phillips Falzone, Playing The Hollywood 
Name Game In Cybercourt: The Battle Over Domain Names In The Age Of Celebrity-Squatting. 21 LOY. L. 
A. ENT. L. REV. 289 (2001); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem Of Legitimacy. 50 DUKE L. J. 
187 (October 2001); Neil Batavia, That Which We Call a Domain By Any Other Name Would Smell as 
Sweet: The Overboard Protection of Trademark Law as it Applies to Domain Names on the Internet. 53 S. 
C. L. REV. 461 (Winter 2002); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name 
System. 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149 (Spring 2000); Gregory Blasbalg, Masters of Their Domains: 
Trademark Holders Now Have New Ways to Control Their Marks in Cyberspace. 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 563 (Spring 2000); Olivia Baratta and Dana Hanaman, A Global Update on the Domain Name System 
and the Law: alternative Dispute Resolution for Increasing Internet Competition. Oh, the Times They Are 
A-Changin’!. 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325 (Spring 2000); David Post, Of Black Holes and Decentralized 
Law-Making in Cyberspace. 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 70 (Winter 2000); Gillian Hadfield, Privatizing 
Commercial Law: Lessons From ICANN. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 257 (Summer 2002). 
21 Id. 
22 “…[T]he procedural design of ICANN’s UDRP has a number of special features that resulted in an 
especially unjust set of outcomes. Key decisions were made by unrepresentative groups or persons who 
were not subject to any democratic control, and the rules went in effect because of ICANN’s monopoly 
over technical aspect of the Internet, not because any legislature approved them.” Froomkin, supra note 2, 
at 712. 
See, Geist, supra note 20 and Thornburg, supra note 14 (analyzing the bias of the UDRP providers that 
favored complainants.) 
23 Jay Kesan and Andres Gallo, ICANN Politics: Changes and Constituencies. Mimeo, 2003 (in file with 
the authors). 
24 “the main advantage of using the UDRP over filing a lawsuit is that it can generally provide an 
inexpensive and quick resolution for domain name disputes. Because there is no discovery process and no 
absolute right to file endless replies and subreplies after the initial filing of the complaint and the response, 
the costs of a UDRP proceeding can be much less than seeking a preliminary injunction in court. However, 
using the UDRP effectively requires thorough advance preparation, investigation and research.” Jeffrey 
Look, Law and Order on the Wild, Wild West (WWW), 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 817, at 824-825. 
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the provider based on bias or duration of the procedure, we show that duration is at least 
as important as bias in the selection of providers. This is a key finding, since our results 
show that the emphasis of theoretical and empirical work, which has been exclusively 
concentrated around the effects of bias, is misplaced. As we recommend, they should 
start paying attention to other performance and efficiency indicators, as those proposed in 
this paper. 
From our empirical results supporting duration as an important decision variable, 
we use the duration of the cases as the variable to measure the general efficiency of each 
provider. We applied regression models based on the analysis of the duration to identify 
different factors that determine the performance of the system. Hence, our study goes 
beyond the usual empirical questions regarding the final results of the cases, by looking 
at their actual performance of providers. Among our main findings we claim that the 
UDRP providers have different duration functions, implying a different technology in 
treating the cases, which imply the existence of forum shopping. The existence of forum 
shopping based on the performance of the providers is different than the forum shopping 
mentioned in the literature of UDRP, which is based in the bias of the provider towards 
the complainant25. These results are emphasized by the finding that the two most 
important providers are located at the extremes of the possible technological structures of 
the UDRP. Second, the providers have unambiguous bias for specific countries. This 
finding is very important because most of the literature was discussing the bias between 
individuals. Nonetheless, the bias towards countries of origin of the providers could be an 
important element to take into account for the design of a general dispute system as the 
UDRP. Furthermore, the evidence of such a bias delivers a hard blow to ICANN’s claim 
that the system is intended to handle the most diverse claims in the Internet regardless the 
origin of the parties.26. Third, we also find that some panelists have a completely different 
duration function in deciding cases, as compared to the rest of the cases under any private 
                                                          
25 See, Froomkin, supra note 2. 
26 “At the UDRP’s inception, ICANN had three main objectives it sought to achieve. The first goal was to 
create global uniformity. An example of this would be to eliminate competition among jurisdictions –forum 
shopping- and rules that are applied to domain name and trademark disputes. The second goal was to 
reduce the cost of resolving disputes. Finally, the UDRP was intended to be heavily restricted in its 
applicability. It was supposed to be geared toward the most flagrant types of cybersquatting, while other 
disputes would be left to the courts.” Pamela Segal, Attempts to Solve the UDRP’s trademark Holder Bias: 
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provider. Nonetheless, structural differences among providers can have an influence over 
the performance of the judges. An interesting conclusion is that even though some 
panelists can exhibit a different behavior than the rest of the panelists of a provider, that 
could be a good thing and providers should give these panelists more cases to handle. On 
the other hand, if there is a bias in these panelists favoring one party or the other, then 
they should not be awarded so many cases. This evidence calls into question the actual 
system by which the providers assign cases to the panelists, in the sense that the selection 
of the panelist is not innocuous in terms of efficiency. Fourth, the performance of the 
providers is affected by the proofs presented by complainants and respondents. This is an 
indication that decisions are based in the proofs presented according to the rules of the 
UDRP. Finally, we evaluate the differences in performance between one and three 
member panels. We find that three member panels are as efficient as single member 
panels. Accordingly, to change to a general three member panel system could be 
beneficial in terms of fairness without having a negative impact on efficiency. 
The paper is organized as follows: First, we describe the ICANN UDRP system 
and the providers in charge of the dispute resolution process. Second, we present a 
regression model to analyze the selection process for the complainants. Subsequently, we 
describe the regression technique to be used for the empirical analysis and the 
characteristics of the database. Third, we present the general empirical analysis for the 
UDRP system providers. Fourth, we analyze the regression model and present the results 
we obtain. Fifth, we analyze the results in terms of the policy recommendations that can 
be derived from them. Finally, we present the conclusions. 
 
II. ICANN UDRP CHARACTERISTICS 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is the 
organization in charge of managing the IP address space allocation, protocol parameter 
assignment, domain name system management and root server system management 
functions on the Internet.27  This is a non-profit organization supported by many 
                                                                                                                                                                             
A Problem That Remains Unsolved Despite the Introduction of New Top Level Domain Names, 3 CARDOZO 
ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, at 23. 
27 See http://www.icann.org/general/abouticann.htm. For history and development of ICANN see, Michael 
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governments, but mainly the United States government, through the Department of 
Commerce, which promoted its creation in 1998.28  Among its various activities, the 
management of the domain name system has proved to be a delicate area in which 
property and trademark rights from the real world collide with the unregulated nature of 
the Internet.29  New domain names assigned on the Internet could have been protected by 
trademark and property rights laws in different countries.  However, there are many 
problems because of which local courts cannot adequately handle Internet-based 
disputes.30  As a result, conflicts in the rights over domain names on the Internet 
generated a need for an arbitration mechanism to resolve these disputes.31  Many private 
actors, with interests in the creation of such a system and with influence over ICANN, 
together with other organizations, like the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), promoted the creation of a dispute resolution mechanism for domain names. 
WIPO produced a report for ICANN detailing the necessity of creating a dispute 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 
Duke L. J. 17 (2000), Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward A Critical Theory Of 
Cyberspace. 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (January 2003), Edward C. Anderson and Timothy S. Cole, The 
UDRP- A Model for Dispute Resolution in E-commerce? 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 235.  
28 “Formed in October 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a non-
profit, private-sector corporation formed by a broad coalition of the Internet's business, technical, academic, 
and user communities. ICANN has been recognized by the U.S. and other governments as the global 
consensus entity to coordinate the technical management of the Internet's domain name system, the 
allocation of IP address space, the assignment of protocol parameters, and the management of the root 
server system.” See, http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.htm. “Prior to the formation of ICANN, 
administration of the authoritative list ultimately linking particular names and numbers (Internet Protocol 
(IP) addresses) to specific computers was the responsibility of various departments of the U.S. government 
and, later, Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), a for profit corporation operating under contract with the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. … Objections to the monopoly over registration services held by NSI (and the 
U.S. government) led in 1998 to the creation of ICANN and in particular ICANN’s capacity to authorize 
multiple registrars to compete over registration services.” Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial 
Law: Lessons From ICANN. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 257 (Summer 2002), at 259-260. 
Many critics have said that ICANN received important power from the U.S. government, which were 
deserved for the government instead of a private institution. See for example, Michael Froomkin, id., 
(claiming that the ICANN creation is not consistent with both the Constitution and the Administrative 
Procedure Act). However this is a highly debatable topic, as can be seen in Edward Brunet, Defending 
Ecommerce’s Contract Delegation of Power to ICANN. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (Spring 2002). 
29 See Jay Kesan and Andres Gallo, Optimizing Internet Regulation, Working Paper 2003. (in file with 
authors) (describing the problems of regulation in the Internet). 
30 See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace. 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (October 2002) 
(analyzing the problems courts have in dealing with Internet related issues). 
31 “Reconciling the competing interests of trademark owners and domain name registrants has not proved 
an easy task, either nationally or internationally. The territorial nature of trademark rights, the lack of a 
single body of rules governing trademark-domain name disputes, the difficulty of locating registrants, and 
the possibility that different domain name registrants own multiple iterations of a preexisting mark all make 
the prospect of litigating before national courts protracted, expensive and perhaps even futile. Not 
surprisingly, trademark owners have expressed interest in streamlined and inexpensive non-national dispute 
settlement alternatives, particularly for disputes with a class of domain name registrants known as 
cybersquatters.” Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The 
Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (October 
2001), at 154-155. 
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resolution system and proposing specific rules of such a system.32  This report was the 
blue print for the new regime created by ICANN afterwards33.  Consequently, in 1999, 
ICANN enacted the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP).34  
Under this policy, ICANN authorized a number of private third-party institutions 
(Providers) to evaluate disputes among Internet users regarding rights over domain 
names.35  ICANN designed a series of general rules to regulate the dispute resolution 
procedures, leaving the private providers to add their own complementary rules to the 
system.36  The UDRP has been harshly criticized by some scholars and commentators, 
and at the same time it has received support from others.37  The capacity of ICANN in 
enforcing and applying the UDRP regime to the registered domain names is based on the 
contractual relationship each user enters with ICANN at the moment of registering a new 
domain name38. In this section, we describe the main characteristics of the UDRP system 
identifying the weaknesses and strengths of this regime, as well as delineating the 
questions to be tested with our regression model. 
                                                          
32 See, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (describing the timetable of creation of the UDRP 
with links to WIPO initiative).  See, Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-
National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy. 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
141 (October 2001) (describing the proposal of WIPO and the reforms introduced by ICANN when 
implementing the system.) 
33 See, Froomkin, supra note 2 (describing the differences between WIPO proposal and the final ICANN’s 
UDRP.) 
34 See Helfer and Dinwoodie, supra note 31. (describing the creation of the UDRP). See also the ICANN 
timeline for development and application of the policy, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm.  
35 The approved providers are: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) December 1st 1999, The 
National Forum Arbitration (NAF) December 23rd 1999, eResolutions (eRes) January 1st 2000 (terminated 
November 30th 2001, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR) May 22nd 2000 and Asian Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC) February 28th 2002, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-
providers.htm.  
36 The two main instruments that regulate the system are the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy (UDRP) and the Rules for the Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy, both documents 
approved in October 24th 1999. See, http://www.icann.org/udrp/. Each provider can produce its own rules 
in those areas not regulated by the Policy. For supplemental rules, see 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm.  
37 See, supra note 20. 
38 “When ICANN licenses a registrar to offer a .com, .net, .org, .info, .biz, or shortly, .name second-level 
domains, that registrar agrees to incorporate the UDRP into its agreement with the registrant; therefore, all 
domain names in those TLD’s are subject to its terms.” Goldstein, supra note 20, at 1161. 
“One can see the superficial appeal of an ICANN-like process to resolve international Internet disputes. 
First, it applies globally…. This eliminates the tricky issue of personal jurisdiction over the domain name 
holder. It also manages to create a contractually mandated private system for the benefit of noncontracting 
parties. Second, because the process does not require (or even allow) personal appearances by the parties, it 
minimizes geographic distance problems. … Third, the UDRP attempts to overcome the choice of the law 
problems raise by differences in national trademark laws by creating its own “law” in the ICANN Policy. 
Finally, because ICANN has a contract with the company that controls the root server that assigns domain 
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 A. PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT 
 The general procedure for considering complaints is competitive and one in which 
different organizations can offer dispute resolution services to users.39  This is different 
from the usual alternative dispute resolution providers that handle privacy rights in the 
Internet, in which one of the parties is subject to the private provider imposed by the web 
site visited and, in addition, there are multiple rules created by a number of providers40.  
In the UDRP system, Internet users can choose the provider knowing that the underlying 
set of rules is uniform and consistent among providers. However, by letting the 
complainant to choose the provider, ICANN has created an incentive for providers to 
favor complainants in their decisions41.  ICANN provides a set of rules that delimits the 
issues to be regulated, the cases that providers should evaluate, the minimum 
requirements for the composition of the panel and the penalties to be applied.42  However, 
it permits providers freedom to implement further rules and to charge the corresponding 
fees.43  As a result, we have a system where users face a common set of rules, but 
complainants can choose the provider they prefer.  This framework has created good 
incentives for competition among providers of domain name dispute resolution services 
offered at a reasonably low cost.44  However, it has also generated problems of bias in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
names, it has the power to enforce the arbitrators’ decisions without the need to ask a court to enforce the 
judgment.” Thornburg, supra note 15,at 196. 
39 The two main instruments that regulate the system are the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy (UDRP) and the Rules for the Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy, both documents 
approved in October 24th 1999. See, http://www.icann.org/udrp/. Each provider can produce its own rules 
in those areas not regulated by the Policy. For supplemental rules, see 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm. 
40 See, Kesan and Gallo, supra note 29 (analyzing the efficiency of top-down and bottom-up regulation for 
privacy rights in e-commerce.) 
41 See, Giest, supra note 20, and Froomkin, supra note 2 (analyzing the bias of the UDRP providers with 
respect to complainants.) 
42 See http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (listing the policy rules). See Appendix A for a list of the 
main requirements for the disputes to be considered valid. For an analysis of the policy see Michael 
Froomkin supra note 2. 
43 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
44 “Considering that the filling fee for a dispute involving a single domain name, heard by a single panelist, 
can be as low as $1,150. The UDRP is an attractive alternative to protracted litigation. While there are 
several factors that contribute to the low cost of a UDRP proceeding, the primary reason is the simplicity of 
the process. The administrative panel is limited to considering the written submissions made by the parties. 
The UDRP does not provide for discovery or submission of interrogatories by the parties, elements that 
typically increase the cost of other processes, in both time and money.” Edward C. Anderson and Timothy 
S. Cole, The UDRP- A Model for Dispute Resolution in E-commerce? 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 
235, at 249. 
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favor of complainants, who are the entities choosing the provider.45  Therefore, in the 
current system, complainants have an incentive to choose the provider who is friendlier to 
complainants, and the providers’ optimal strategy is to favor complainants in order to 
ensure that they continue to be chosen in the future.46
 The complaints that are evaluated under this system are only those related to 
domain name disputes.47  Figure 1 shows the different stages the claim goes through 
during the procedure. The procedure depicted in Figure 1 can vary marginally because of 
the different supplemental rules of the providers. 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 “This study provides compelling evidence that forum shopping has become an integral part of the UDRP 
and that the system may indeed be biased in favor of trademark holders. Both WIPO and NAF, the two 
dominant ICANN accredited arbitration providers, feature case allocation that suggests that the panelist 
selection process is not random. Rather, it appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a majority of 
cases are steered toward complainant friendly panelists. Moreover, the data shows that there is a correlation 
between the provider panelist selection and case outcome. When providers control who decides a case, as 
they do for all single panel cases, complainants win just over 83% of the time. As provider influence over 
panelists diminishes, as occurs in three-member panel cases, the complainant winning percentage drops to 
60%.” Geist, supra note 20, at 936 
46 It is interesting to notice that the only provider that declared bankruptcy was e-resolution, which was the 
one with more cases won by respondents. 
47 “All other disputes between you and any party other than us regarding your domain name registration 
that are not brought pursuant to the mandatory administrative proceeding provisions of Paragraph 4 shall be 
resolved between you and such other party through any court, arbitration or other proceeding that may be 
available.” UDRP part 5, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.  
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Figure 1: UDRP General Procedure 
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The complainant can file a complaint with any of the approved providers that ICANN has 
authorized.48  The selection of the provider in hands of the complainant has been one of 
the most critical issues in the analysis of bias in the UDRP procedure49. Once the 
provider receives the complaint, it has to evaluate its validity.  If the complaint is not 
valid, then the provider could either ask for further information or discard the complaint.  
In case the complaint is found to be valid, we then have a case that has to be resolved by 
the provider.  The provider asks the respondent to submit a defense responding to the 
complaint.  Once the respondent has submitted an answer, or the legal time period for a 
response has expired, i.e. the respondent is declared in default, the provider forms a 
panel.  This panel can be either a one or a three-member panel, as requested by the 
parties.50  However, in contrast to other alternative dispute resolution forums that operate 
                                                          
48 See Appendix A for a graphic description of complaints procedure. 
49 “Rather than both sides having equal input into who will decide the case, the complainant chooses the 
arbitral tribunal from a small list of approved providers maintained by ICANN. Unlike standard arbitration 
clauses where the provider is specified in the presumably bargained-for contract or negotiated by the parties 
at the time of the dispute, the respondent has no say in which provider will manage her case, and no 
peremptory challenges to arbitrators she may fear are biased. The respondent can, however, pick one 
member of a three-person panel at her own expense if the complainant opted for a single panelist and the 
respondent decides three are needed. Overall, the system gives dispute resolution providers an economic 
incentive to compete by being complainant-friendly.” Froomkin, supra note 2, at 671-672. 
50 According with the UDRP the panel is formed as follows: “Appointment of the Panel and Timing of 
Decision
(a) Each Provider shall maintain and publish a publicly available list of panelists and their qualifications. 
(b) If neither the Complainant nor the Respondent has elected a three-member Panel (Paragraphs 3(b)(iv) 
and 5(b)(iv)), the Provider shall appoint, within five (5) calendar days following receipt of the response by 
the Provider, or the lapse of the time period for the submission thereof, a single Panelist from its list of 
panelists. The fees for a single-member Panel shall be paid entirely by the Complainant. 
(c) If either the Complainant or the Respondent elects to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, 
the Provider shall appoint three Panelists in accordance with the procedures identified in Paragraph 6(e). 
The fees for a three-member Panel shall be paid in their entirety by the Complainant, except where the 
election for a three-member Panel was made by the Respondent, in which case the applicable fees shall be 
shared equally between the Parties. 
(d) Unless it has already elected a three-member Panel, the Complainant shall submit to the Provider, 
within five (5) calendar days of communication of a response in which the Respondent elects a three-
member Panel, the names and contact details of three candidates to serve as one of the Panelists. These 
candidates may be drawn from any ICANN-approved Provider's list of panelists. 
(e) In the event that either the Complainant or the Respondent elects a three-member Panel, the Provider 
shall endeavor to appoint one Panelist from the list of candidates provided by each of the Complainant and 
the Respondent. In the event the Provider is unable within five (5) calendar days to secure the appointment 
of a Panelist on its customary terms from either Party's list of candidates, the Provider shall make that 
appointment from its list of panelists. The third Panelist shall be appointed by the Provider from a list of 
five candidates submitted by the Provider to the Parties, the Provider's selection from among the five being 
made in a manner that reasonably balances the preferences of both Parties, as they may specify to the 
Provider within five (5) calendar days of the Provider's submission of the five-candidate list to the Parties. 
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in the privacy rights area (ADRs), here the panelists are elected from a list elaborated by 
the provider and in agreement with the parties, at least in the three-member panel case.  
As a result, even though the complainant can elect the provider, the respondent has the 
choice of determining the panel composition, making the panel more transparent than in 
the case of privacy rights forums, where the panelists are appointed directly by the 
provider, without the parties’ intervention.51  Nonetheless, the participation of the 
respondents takes place just in the case of three-member panels. Otherwise, it is the 
provider the one in charge of appointing the panelist. This procedure has been criticized 
because of the bias providers have in favoring complainants52.  Once the panel is 
constituted, they have to decide on the case, with the power to ask for additional 
information from any of the parties.  In case the parties reach a private agreement, the 
panel terminates its process, without any further decision.  If any of the parties initiate a 
court trial, the panel can continue with its deliberations or decide to terminate the case.53  
Even though according to the rules of the UDRP both parties have the same period of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(f) Once the entire Panel is appointed, the Provider shall notify the Parties of the Panelists appointed and 
the date by which, absent exceptional circumstances, the Panel shall forward its decision on the complaint 
to the Provider. 
51 See previous section. 
52 “Given these inevitable biases, the ICANN Policy fails in another important way. Each DRP lists a 
number of approved arbitrators, but there is no information about how particular individuals are assigned to 
particular cases, particularly those involving only one arbitrator. In those cases, the parties have no input 
into the assignment of the arbitrator. Except in cases of the most obvious and improper kind of bias, it is 
unlikely a party could successfully challenge a panelist. Each DRP has its own procedural rules regarding 
challenges. The grounds upon which a challenge can be brought also vary. For example, NAF sets forth 
specific grounds for disqualification. None would preclude an arbitrator with known attitudes about 
meaning of controversial UDRP provisions from deciding a case. Nor is there a system for allowing parties, 
after a proceeding is over, to register complaints about a particular decisionmaker.” Thornburg, supra note 
15, at 222. 
53 “k. Availability of Court Proceedings. The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set forth 
in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of 
competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative proceeding is 
commenced or after such proceeding is concluded. If an Administrative Panel decides that your domain 
name registration should be canceled or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the 
location of our principal office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of the Administrative 
Panel's decision before implementing that decision. We will then implement the decision unless we have 
received from you during that ten (10) business day period official documentation (such as a copy of a 
complaint, file-stamped by the clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the 
complainant in a jurisdiction to which the complainant has submitted under Paragraph 3(b)(xiii) of the 
Rules of Procedure. (In general, that jurisdiction is either the location of our principal office or of your 
address as shown in our Whois database. See Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure for 
details.) If we receive such documentation within the ten (10) business day period, we will not implement 
the Administrative Panel's decision, and we will take no further action, until we receive (i) evidence 
satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties; (ii) evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has 
been dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit or 
ordering that you do not have the right to continue to use your domain name.” UDRP part 4.k, at 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm. 
 16
grace to take the case to a court, some scholars have mentioned that the short time 
available is unfavorable for respondents54. As in the case of the privacy rights ADRs, the 
providers do not have jurisdiction in case of matters initiated in court, which is one of the 
main limitations of these types of dispute resolution regimes55.  That said, most UDRP 
cases have not been contested in court, and the parties have accepted the panel 
decisions.56 Furthermore, one of the problems of the UDRP procedure is the absence of a 
review mechanism for complaints57. This type of mechanism is in place in other private 
ADRs and could provide for better review and control of the panelists’ decisions.58
 One of the main advantages of the UDRP regime in comparison to other private 
dispute resolution systems in the Internet is that ICANN has the power to enforce the 
panel decisions59.  The only action that the panel can enforce is the termination or transfer 
of the domain name in dispute, which is, of course, under the management of ICANN.60  
As a result, enforcement is almost perfect, when compared to the lack of enforcement that 
privacy rights dispute resolution providers, dealing with different jurisdictions and the 
lack of government support, have to contend with61.  The enforcement ability arises from 
                                                          
54 See, Froomkin, supra note 2 (analyzing the extent of the bias for respondents to resort to a Court action.) 
55 “Although a UDRP decision is, in some respects, self-enforcing, it is not binging. Either before or after a 
UDRP decision, either party can take the matter to court. Even after an adverse decision under the UDRP, a 
respondent could pursue de novo litigation against a successful claimant. This ability to “appeal” an 
unsuccessful UDRP case was recently affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals.” Edward Anderson 
and Tymothy Cole, supra note 44, at 250. 
56 According with UDRPLaw.net until July 2002, just 65 UDRP cases were taken to Court. This is a small 
number as compared with the more than 6,000 cases UDRP providers had considered since 1999. See, 
http://www.udrplaw.net/.  
57 “UDRP arbitrators have rendered decisions that are inconsistent in their interpretation of the substantive 
requirements and in their implementation of the procedural rules. Because the process contains no internal 
appeal process, there is no way to challenge any of these decisions, either to correct the result in an 
individual case or to reconcile splits in what is becoming the “law” of ICANN. There is no way to correct 
arbitrators who are creating bad “law” or those who believe that trademark holders should have broader 
rights than those included in the UDRP as written.” Thornburg, supra note 15, at 224. 
58 See, Kesan and Gallo, supra note 29 (describing the procedure of private ADRs). 
59 See, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
60 Again, the characteristic of the Root system for the Internet, which is managed and monopolized by 
ICANN generates a disincentive to other providers to offer other root of Domain Names. As a result, the 
actual design of the system provides ICANN with a well defined power of enforcement for the UDRP. See, 
Mueller, supra note 20 (describing the lack of competition and monopoly of ICANN and the incentives the 
organization participants have to maintain the system as it is.) 
61 One of the main weaknesses in enforcement is the existence of diverse roots in the Internet. Nonetheless, 
because ICANN is the most important of these servers, there are just few domain names that cannot be 
reached by ICANN enforcement capabilities. The case of ccTLDs are special since they are can be limited 
to the national jurisdictions of the participant countries. 
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both the design of ICANN, which is an organization supported by the United States 
government and accepted by some other countries as the organization which manages 
domain names and also from the design of the root system that favors an uncompetitive 
market for root names.62  The legitimacy of its functions, at least among the groups that 
have direct influence on ICANN Board of Directors, provides the base for enforcement of 
the rules on domain name dispute resolution.63  These characteristics, which are 
surprisingly based on governmental delegation of powers to ICANN, make the UDRP 
one of the most viable systems for dispute resolution on the Internet. 
 Nonetheless, in order to maintain its legitimacy among countries and different 
Internet users, i.e. beyond the groups that are currently part of the policymaking process, 
ICANN has to develop new ways to introduce the many constituencies of the Internet 
into its decision-making process64.  If we look at how ICANN is formed, we can see that 
some constituencies on the Internet have a high degree of control over its policymaking 
process, meanwhile, other groups, mainly users but also the private sector, have a low 
level of participation65.  The success of the UDRP, and ICANN itself, will depend upon 
the political pressure exerted over ICANN to involve new participants and to develop 
new ways of letting wide-ranging interest groups influence its decision-making.66  In 
contrast to the privacy rights providers, this particular structure makes the UDRP both 
more subject to criticism but also more susceptible to change, while at the same time 
creating an opportunity to maintain the consensus around the common set of rules of the 
system.  
 
B. NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS 
Under the UDRP system, every person or entity that registers a new domain name is 
subject to the policies created by ICANN, since the companies that manage domain name 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“An important aspect of the UDRP is the enforceability of the decisions. Although trademark holders only 
have two remedies available to them under the UDRP, enforcement of a successful result is automatic 
(absent court action by the respondent).” Anderson and Cole supra note 44, at 250. 
62 Id. 
63 Legitimacy of ICANN actions have been under strong debate lately. See, Helfer and Dinwoodie, supra 
note 20 (discussing how the problems of the UDRP undermine the legitimacy under which it is based). 
64 See, Froomkin, supra note 2 (questioning the legitimacy of ICANN to impose its policies in the Interent.) 
65 See, Kesan and Gallo, supra note 23 (discussing the political process inside ICANN). 
66 Id.  
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assignments on the Internet are subject to ICANN authorization.67  As a result, most of 
the domain name owners are subject to the regulations of the UDRP.68  This provides the 
system with wide coverage and uniform regulation throughout most of the Internet.  This 
feature is another important difference with respect to other attempts to create private 
dispute resolution systems in which the adoption of their regulatory regime is voluntary69.  
The specific design of ICANN as the only institution that manages domain names, and 
the support from different governments, generates a quasi-automatic jurisdiction for those 
who request a new domain name in any of the gTLDs. 
 
C. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
In the case of the UDRP, the nature of the issue regulated permits better enforcement 
of the rules70.  However, international cooperation is needed to sustain the policy that is 
put in place throughout the Internet.71  Since ICANN relied on the support of the U.S. 
government, other developed countries have followed, and now support the jurisdiction 
of ICANN to resolve domain name disputes.72  Nonetheless, most ccTLDs are still out of 
reach from the jurisdiction of ICANN with respect to the UDRP policy73. However, the 
technical dependency of ccTLDs from ICANN, and in the end, from the United States 
                                                          
67 “1. Purpose. This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has been adopted by 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), is incorporated by reference into 
your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the terms and conditions in connection with a dispute between 
you and any party other than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet domain name 
registered by you. Proceedings under Paragraph 4 of this Policy will be conducted according to the Rules 
for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules of Procedure"), which are available at 
www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm, and the selected administrative-dispute-resolution service 
provider's supplemental rules.” UDRP part 1, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.  
68 This characteristic depends on the concentrated structure of the root system and the lack of competition. 
See, Mueller, supra note 1. 
69 See, Kesan and Gallo, supra note 29. 
70 “ICANN has largely succeeded in solving the enforcement dilemma, although it is not a solution that 
could easily be replicated in a different context. Because ICANN has a contract with Networ kSolutions, 
Inc., which controls the computer that physically assigns each domain name, it can otself enforce the 
UDRP decision. A winning complainant will either be awarded the domain name at issue or the name will 
be cancelled.” Thornburg, supra note 15, at 207. 
71 The need for international cooperation is explained by the participation of ccTLDs as one of the most 
actives ICANN constituencies. Furthermore, it is trough these international actors that ICANN can 
cooperate in the developing of rules that applies throughout the Internet. Recently, ccTLDs have upgraded 
their participation and voice in ICANN policymaking process. See, next section discussion. 
72 See, http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm (listing all the countries that participate in ICANN.) 
73 Up to nowadays only a handful of ccTLDs have signed Sponsorship Agreements with ICANN. See, 
http://www.icann.org/cctlds/ (showing information about the ccTLDs managers that signed agreements 
with ICANN.) 
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government, hinders the real reach of the sovereignty of country code managers74. The 
reforms in ICANN political structure in 2002, which gave more participation to ccTLDs 
could be considered a political maneuver to reach a wider international consensus about 
ICANN policies75. 
There are some characteristics of the ICANN structure that help explain this success 
in reaching international consensus.  First, the management structure of ICANN has 
become more open to participation and, especially after last year’s reforms, the 
international community has more say on ICANN policymaking.76  Different 
constituencies from all around the globe can participate in the decision-making and 
shaping of ICANN policies.77  Given the interest of ICANN in becoming an international 
body with jurisdiction over the Internet, it is not surprising that there have been major 
changes in the way Board members are elected and also regarding the participation of 
Country Code registries (ccTLDs).78  These changes will permit more cooperation at the 
                                                          
74 “Technically, the ccTLDs are subdomains of the “root domain” created by the U.S. government and 
“contained” in the root zone file. Despite the U.S. reservation of technical control over the A root, the U.S. 
government states that “[n]ational governments now have, and will continue to have, authority to manage 
or establish policy for their own ccTLDs,” thereby attempting to downplay the influence that the U.S. may 
indirectly have over the policies of nations foreign to the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. maintained that 
national governments and intergovernmental organizations should not directly manage the Internet names 
and addresses. On this account, ICANN was intended to be a purely technical coordinating body, whereas 
national governments would continue to control national politics.” Kim G. von Arx and Gregory R. Hagen, 
A Declaration of Independence of ccTLDs from Foreign Control, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, at 20. 
75 See, Kesan and Gallo, supra note 23. (describing the creation of a ccNSO constituency to participate 
directly in the management of ICANN.) 
76 Id. (analyzing how the pressure groups inside ICANN successfully resisted changes to their political 
influence). 
77 See http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-15dec02.htm (listing the new bylaws of 
ICANN with important changes in the influence of different groups on the policy process.) 
78 Until December 15th 2002 the Board of Directors of the ICANN was composed by 19 members. Five of 
them came from the original Board of Directors established in 1998 and the other 14 came from the 
following organizations: 5 from At Large Membership. Each of these directors should represent a different 
geographic unit: Africa, Asia-Australia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean and North 
America. 3 Board Members came from the Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO). The DNSO 
was composed by different constituency groups: Business, Non-Commercial, ccTLD Registries, gTLD 
Registries, ISPs, Registrars and Intellectual Property Constituency. 3 Board Members came from the 
Address Supporting Organization (ASO). This group was composed by the Asian Pacific Network 
Information Center (APNIC), American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN), Latin American and 
Caribbean Internet Address Registry (LACNIC) and Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre 
(RIPENCC). Finally, 3 Board Members came from the Protocol Supporting Organizations (PSO). The PSO 
was composed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 
International Communication Union (ITU-T) and the European Telecommunications Standard Institute 
(ETSI). 
By the new By-Laws of the ICANN, beginning in December 15th 2002, the Board of Directors should be 
composed by 15 members elected as follows: 8 Directors from the Nominating Committee, 2 from ASO, 2 
from Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO), 2 by Generic Name Supporting Organization 
(GNSO) and 1 is the President of ICANN. The Nominating Committee is composed as follows: 5 from At 
Large Representation, 2 from Business Constituency of GNSO), 1 from gTLD Registry, 1 from gTLD 
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international level, which will allow for better enforcement of dispute resolution 
policies.79  Nonetheless, the inclusion of international actors will also increase the need 
for reform in the UDRP in order to accommodate different international perspectives.  
For example, the growth of the Internet in Asia and the interest of ICANN to continue 
being the main source of control and regulation over domain names have prompted the 
creation of two new offices, one in Hong Kong and the other in Beijing, to resolve 
disputes in the Asian region.80  As a result, the UDRP could accommodate different 
views and be open to changes, even though the resistance of groups with more power 
inside ICANN will resist such reforms.81  Second, the constituencies that form the board 
of ICANN were created to permit people from different countries to be part of it and have 
a voice in the political process.82  Nonetheless, the governance of ICANN has been 
relegated to groups and constituencies that were introduced as initial parts of the 
organization.83  As ICANN tries to move to a more international environment, these 
constituencies should accommodate other interests mainly from other countries – the 
private sector, internet users and the government.  In this sense, we can say that ICANN 
is an institution in its formative stage, in which different constituencies and groups try to 
establish positions in the management of the institution, but without an already 
established procedure or representation.84 However, the forces that shape the political 
characteristics of ICANN will also shape the rules of its dispute resolution policy.  In the 
end, if ICANN succeeds in promoting and enforcing a set of dispute resolution rules for 
Domain Names throughout the Internet, it will be due to the capacity of its constituencies 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Registrars, 1 from Council Country Code NSO, 1 from ISP constituency GNSO, 1 from Intellectual 
Property Constituency GNSO, 1 from ASO, 1 designated by ICANN Board to represent Academy and 
other similar institutions, 1 from Consumer and Civil Society Groups from the Non-commercial 
constituency of GNSO, 1 from IETF and 1 from ICANN Technical Liaison Group. See 
http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-15dec02.htm#VI for a complete version of the new 
By-Laws of ICANN. 
79 See, http://www.icann.org/cctlds/ (describing the objectives and activities of ccTLDs in ICANN.) 
80 See, http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html  
81 The analysis of the next section is a good example on how stakeholders of ICANN could resist major 
reforms on the policymaking and retain power. 
82 “The ICANN Bylaws provide for three Supporting Organizations (SOs) to assist, review and develop 
recommendations on Internet policy and structure within three specialized areas. (See Bylaws, Articles 
VIII, IX, and X.) The SOs help to promote the development of Internet policy and encourage diverse and 
international participation in the technical management of the Internet. Each SO names three Directors to 
the ICANN Board” http://www.icann.org/general/support-orgs.htm (describing the different constituencies 
that support ICANN). 
83 See, next section. 
84 The reform process initiated in 2002 and the debate about the role of ICANN and the division of power 
among different constituencies is a proof of ICANN as an organization in a formation stage. 
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to accommodate different demands and due to the political process inside the corporation 
that enables such a process to occur. 
 
D. USER PARTICIPATION 
 In the case of the UDRP, user participation is much higher than in the previous 
case study of the privacy rights TPIs.85  First, every user that registers a Domain Name on 
the ICANN-managed root server is automatically under the jurisdiction of the providers 
and is subject to the rules of the UDRP.86  Second, ICANN has provided, in theory, 
numerous ways by which users can contact the organization and propose reforms to the 
dispute resolution system.87  Furthermore, in ICANN, users have direct participation on 
the Board of Directors, through the election of representatives in the At Large Group, and 
in the GNSO group, under the constituency of non-commercial users.88  However, user 
participation on ICANN policymaking has been scarce and the commercial private sector 
is the main power that is in control of ICANN.  As a result, although ICANN fares better 
than the privacy rights TPIs, as seen from our analysis in the previous section, it is still 
biased towards private firms’ interests regarding domain name policies.   
 There are many critics pointing to the lack of democratic participation in the 
decision-making of ICANN.89  For example, ICANN has strictly controlled the number 
of top-level domain names, which has created an artificial scarcity in the market.90  
Furthermore, this scarcity has favored specific private firms with interests in controlling 
                                                          
85 From the many critics mentioned in footnote 20, user participation in ICANN is far from being ideal. 
However, we found it more important than in the case of purely private regulation systems. 
86 “All registrars in the .aero, .biz, .com, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, .net, and .org top-level domains 
follow the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (often referred to as the "UDRP").” Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/  
87 See http://www.icann.org/. (describing multiple instruments users have to reach ICANN and participate). 
88 See http://www.icann.org/committees/alac/ (describing the tasks and composition of the At Large Group) 
and http://gnso.icann.org/ (describing and informing on the different constituencies that are part of the 
GNSO). 
89 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
90 “ICANN’s attempts to safeguard intellectual property interests in the domain name space also shaped its 
policies toward the introduction of new top-level domains. New TLDs were given a low priority relative to 
other objectives. Movement toward that goal was extremely slow. When new ones were introduced, the 
number was small and the approval process encouraged registries to employ practices that would privilege 
trademark holders in the initial assignment of names. So-called “sunrise” or “daybreak” procedures, for 
example, allow all the world’s trademark holders the privilege of preregistering their names in a new top-
level domain before the domain is opened up to anyone else. Both techniques offer preemptive forms of 
protection that simply do not exist in traditional trademark law.” Mueller, supra note 1, at 193.. 
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this resource.91  By letting private firms compete with each other to provide options in the 
top-level domain name arena, ICANN could improve users’ welfare by providing more 
alternatives than what exists nowadays92.  However, competition at this level will 
decrease the value of the top domain names that already exist today, hurting the profits of 
the firms that control them.  As these firms have significant influence over ICANN’s 
decisions, it is to be expected that they will exert pressure to avoid such competition.  
Nonetheless, if ICANN wants to promote cooperation and continue to advance in its 
governance of the Domain Name system, as it appears to want to do nowadays, it should 
accommodate to users’ demands.  For example, one of the most common criticisms of the 
UDRP is that the domain name rules enforced by providers are designed to protect 
trademark holders’ interests on the Internet, at the expense of free speech interests93.  For 
example, if somebody registers a domain name called FIFAWorldCup.com, devoted to 
criticizing the way the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) has 
designed the classification groups for the 2006 World Cup in Germany, FIFA could claim 
that this domain name infringes on its own trademark rights and seek to cancel this 
registration by initiating a complaint with a UDRP provider.  These kinds of problems 
have arisen because of the small number of top-level domain names and the broad 
definitions applied for the type of content that is admissible under each top-level domain 
name.  For example, if ICANN creates a new top-level domain name for free speech, 
such as .fsp, in which all domain name registrants have to be individuals or non-
commercial entities and in which all names, including trademarks, can be used, together 
with a prohibition against undertaking commercial activities in this space, many of the 
free speech concerns can be accommodated.  ICANN can then have a commercial set of 
top-level domain set of names in which trademarks are the rule for name assignment, and 
also a free speech section in which users can express themselves without fear of their 
                                                          
91 Id. 
92 See Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark Disputes under 
ICANN’s UDRP. Convergence Center working Paper, June 2002. (describing the scarcity created by 
ICANN in the gTLDs registry.) 
93 See, Blackman, supra note 6 (analyzing the issues of free speech in the Internet, with particular reference 
to the Domain Name System.) 
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domain names and free speech rights being suppressed. Nonetheless, under the current 
interests that dominate ICANN, such a simple technical change could not be expected94. 
 With respect to the UDRP itself, there is better participation of Internet users 
employing these dispute procedures, as compared to the privacy rights forums95.  First, 
both parties have the opportunity to take part in the formation of the panel, guaranteeing a 
higher degree of impartiality and independence than in the case of panels constituted 
directly by the private providers with interests dominated by private businesses.96  
Nonetheless, it is clear that the ICANN system is far from being independent, given its 
bias towards private firms, although this bias is less than in the case of the totally private 
privacy rights forums.97  Second, given that the general governing rules employed by the 
UDRP providers are supplied by ICANN, and users do have the opportunity –although 
limited- to place representatives on ICANN’s Board of Directors, these rules could be 
subject to review in order to insure a more fair treatment of non-commercial parties98.  
Third, international users have more say in the rules and management of ICANN 
compared to privacy rights providers, given the attempts to construct a more international 
organization99.  As a result, more cooperation can be expected on the international sphere, 
and a broader consensus may be achieved around the UDRP100.  Finally, as governments 
participate in the process, it is more probable that consumers and other users can exert 
more influence over ICANN’s decisions when compared to the totally private system that 
regulate privacy in e-commerce101. 
 
                                                          
94 See, Kesan and Gallo, supra note 23. 
95 See, Kesan and Gallo, supra note 29. 
96 See, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm  
97 See different points of view and critics detailed in footnote 20. 
98 The recent reform of ICANN has drastically reduced the representation of at large groups in the decision 
making process of ICANN, increasing the doubts about the legitimacy of the Corporation. See, Kesan and 
Gallo, supra note 23. 
99 “ICANN must be understood as a new international regime formed around a global shared resource. Its 
purpose is to define property rights in Internet identifiers and to regulate their consumption and supply. … 
The emerging Internet governance regime is the product of an informal political agreement among national 
governments, and the agreement includes much more extensive role for private sector actors. That fact does 
make ICANN different from other international regimes, but it does not change its basic nature. It is much 
more accurate and analytically fruitful to define ICANN as a variant of a standard international regime than 
it is to think of it as something sui generis.” Mueller, supra note 1, at 217-218. 
100 “ICANN’s creation of its own international trademark law is inherently controversial. What right does a 
California nonprofit corporation have to create and impose law that differs from the law on nation-states?” 
Thornburg, supra note 15, at 208. 
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III. UDRP PROVIDERS 
 
 ICANN has authorized private providers to manage the complaints presented by 
Internet users102. These providers should follow the policy guidelines designed by 
ICANN, but they can complement these rules with their own103. Initially, ICANN 
authorized two providers, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the 
National Arbitration Forum (NAF), approved by ICANN on December 1st and 23rd of 
1999, respectively. Afterwards, in 2000, ICANN added two more providers, eResolution 
(eRes) in January and CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR) approved in May 
2000. Of these providers, eRes ceased to operate in November 2001. Recently, in 
February 2002, a new provider has been approved, Asian Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Centre, with two offices in Beijing and Hong Kong104. In this work we will 
analyze the cases of the initial four providers of the UDRP. 
 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is an organization 
dependent of the United Nations105. It was created in 1994 with the aim of providing 
mediation services to between private parties in specific areas106. Its headquarters are 
geographically located in Geneva, Switzerland. WIPO has been one of the main actors 
that influenced the creation of the UDRP regime by ICANN. In April 1999 WIPO 
produced a final report on the creation of a domain name resolution system, which was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
101 See, Kesan and Gallo, supra note 29. 
102 See, http://www.icann.org  
103 See, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm  
104 http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html (The website of the Asian provider) and 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-03dec01.htm (The announcement of ICANN creating 
the new Asian provider for the UDRP regime.) 
105 “WIPO is one of the 16 specialized agencies of the United Nations system of organizations. It 
administers 23 international treaties dealing with different aspects of intellectual property protection.” At 
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/overview.html  
“WIPO is an organ of the United Nations with specific duties defined by a series of treaties. Signatory 
nations send delegates to WIPO, and meet occasionally in plenary to make decisions. Being responsible to 
all its members states rather than just the United States, the WIPO staff felt empowered to define its own 
terms of reference and proposed to make recommendations concerning: 1) disputes prevention; 2) dispute 
resolution; 3) a process to protect famous and well-known marks in the gTLDs; and 4) the effects on 
intellectual property rights of the new gTLDs.” Froomkin, supra note 2, at 624. 
106 “Developed by leading experts in cross-border dispute settlement, the procedures offered by the Center 
are widely recognized as particularly appropriate for technology, entertainment and other disputes 
involving intellectual property.” 
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the blueprint for ICANN own UDRP107. The National Arbitration Forum (NAF) was 
created in 1986 in order to provide alternative dispute resolution services to different 
parties. The NAF is composed by judges and lawyers around the world, with the only aim 
of providing mediation and arbitration services108. It is located in the United States, and 
most of the UDRP cases evaluated by NAF are from the North American region. The 
Center for Public Resources (CPR) was formed in 1979 by major corporations in order to 
provide alternative dispute resolution forums for private business109. This is a nonprofit 
organization with more than 500 private corporations are members of it. Finally, 
eResolution (eRes) suspended its activities in 2001. This provider was geographically 
located in Quebec, Canada. 
 In 2002 ICANN approved the addition of an Asian dispute resolution provider, 
Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC), with offices in Hong Kong 
and Beijing110. This new provider is composed by the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and the Hong Kong International Arbitration 
Centre (HKIAC)111. The CIETAC is the only dispute resolution provider for the top 
domain name .cn. Meanwhile, HKIAC was created in 1985 as an alternative dispute 
resolution system, and in 2001 it was appointed as the sole dispute resolution provider for 
the top domain name .hk112. 
 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROVIDERS 
 As explained before, ICANN provides the rules for the administration of the 
UDRP. Accordingly, the authorized providers have to follow these rules in solving the 
cases. Nonetheless, there are some differences between the providers, because of ICANN 
has left some room for the providers to differ. In this section we analyze the differences 
                                                          
107 See, Final Report of the First WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, at 
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/report/index.html. See also, Froomkin, supra note 2 (analyzing the 
characteristics of the WIPO proposal and the final outcome from ICANN policy.) 
108 “…[T]he Forum’s only mission is to provide superior dispute resolution services to parties seeking an 
alternative to litigation.” At, http://www.arbforum.com/  
109 “Founded in 1979 as the Center for Public Resources, CPR’s mission is to spearhead innovation and 
promote excellence in public and private dispute resolution, and to serve as a primary multinational 
resource for avoidance, management and resolution of business-related and other disputes.” At, 
http://www.cpradr.org/aboutcpr1.htm  
110 See, supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
111 See, http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html  
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between these providers in terms of supplemental rules, fees and relative representation 
in their panels of arbitrators. 
 
1. Supplemental Rules 
 Besides the UDRP rules provided by ICANN, the private providers can add their 
own rules, while they do not contradict ICANN policy113. Most of these additional rules 
are about general procedure for the cases evaluated by the provider, and how participants 
should present information and proofs in terms of characteristics and time schedule. 
Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the supplemental rules for each provider. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
112 Id. 
113 See, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm
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 Table 1: Supplemental Rules of UDRP Authorized Providers 
 WIPO NAF CPR eRes 
Submission 
Requirements 
Coversheet and copies to 
Registrar(s) and Respondent 
Coversheet plus 3 copies (single 
panel) or 5 copies (Three member 
Panel) 
5 Copies Three parts: Complaint proper, 
Annexes and Cover Sheet 
Compliance 
Review 
Center has 5 days to review  Left to the Panel 
without specific 
requirement 
Clerk has 10 days to review and 
Complainant has 5 days to correct 
any deficiency. 
Official 
Administrating 
the Case 
Center appoints Case 
Administrator 
  Clerk’s Office 
Panel 
Appointment 
Three Member Panel: Parties 
should provide list of 3 
candidates, ordered by 
preference. The third panelist 
appointed is the president. 
Parties can agree on naming 
the president. 
Single Member Panel: Appointed 
by the Forum 
Three Member Panel: Chair elected 
by the Provide and no part of the 
Parties list of candidates. 
Not mentioned Single Member Panel: Appointed 
by the Clerk’s office 
Three member Panel: Appointed by 
Provider: One panelist from the 
lists of each party and the third 
appointed by the Provider 
(President). 
Recusation of 
Panelists 
Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Decided by the Clerk’s office 
Respondent 
Default 
Panel should be appointed by 
the Center. 
Panel appointed by the Center. 
Option to change to a one member 
panel should be provided. 
Not Mentioned Panel Appointed by Provider 
Limits to 
Submission 
Word limit: Paragraph 
3(b)(ix) 5000 words 
5(b)(i) 5000 words 
15(e) no word limits. 
Complaint and Response no longer 
than 10 pages total 
Complaint and 
Response not to 
exceed 10 pages 
plus annexes and 
exhibits. 
Not mentioned 
Extension for 
Response 
Not mentioned Extension can be given subject to: 
Parties agreement, informed to the 
Forum, state exceptional 
circumstances, state extension (no 
more than 20 days) and pay 
extension fee $100. Forum will 
decide on the extension. 
Not Mentioned Could be extended by the Panel 
Additional 
Submissions 
Not Mentioned. Within 5 days of submission of the 
Response and it should be 
accompanied by a fee of $250. 
Not Mentioned Not Mentioned 
Source: Own Elaboration based in: http://www.udrpinfo.com/eres/supprules.htm, http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/background/index.html, 
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/UDRP/rules.asp, http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_RulesAndFees.htm. 
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As we can see, even though the differences in the supplementary rules are minimal, and 
most of them are of form in the case of the format and timing of the submissions of 
information and proofs to the panel, the effects of such differences in procedure could 
have important consequences on the efficiency and results of the procedure114. Some of 
the providers have a more complex system of procedure, WIPO115 and eRes116, than 
others, NAF117 and CPR. For example, in the case of CPR, the rules are minimal and 
most of the decisions are left to the panel to decide what is best. It is worth to mention 
that NAF is the only provider that offers incentives to maintain the procedure at a 
minimum of information submissions and time, by introducing extra fees in the case of 
supplemental submissions or the extension in the timing of the response. However, these 
fees could be a problem for parties attempting to propose new proofs or information 
regarding the case118. Nonetheless, the general fee of NAF is lower than the other 
providers, and the extra fees are much smaller. Beyond these small differences, most of 
the rules are similar for all of the providers (Table 1). 
 
 
2. Fees 
 Another of the main issues that can differentiate providers is the fees they charge 
for different types of cases. Differences among the fees the Providers charge can induce 
complainants to switch from one provider to another, given that the set of rules applied is 
the same. Table 2 shows the schedule of fees charged by each provider. 
                                                          
114 See Section IV.1 (analyzing the results of cases handled by the same panelists in different providers.) 
115 “The WIPO/AMC Supplemental Rules include very few changes to ICANN’s Rules. The Supplemental 
Rules do, however, provide for cases to be filed through the Center’s “Internet based case filing and 
administration system”.” Stacey King, The “Law That It Deems Applicable”: ICANN, Dispute Resolution, 
and the Problem of Cybersquatting. 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 453, at 476-477. 
116 “eResolution’s Supplemental Rules include twenty-one definitions. These include the definitions set out 
in the Rules, as well as adding a number of additional definitions. None of the definitions however, 
significantly changes the process or procedures. They simply act to clarify certain terms.” Id., at 478-479. 
117 “Like the WIPO/AMC, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) has adopted the definitions set forth in 
the Rules without supplementing them.” Id., at 481. 
118 “The NAF “sandbag” rule is one of the most pernicious examples of a provider’s attempt to distinguish 
itself as plaintiff-friendly. A rule that allows a party to pay to put in a surprise pleading, perhaps with new 
factual allegations or even a new case in chief, is not a rule calculated to achieve justice.” Froomkin, supra 
note 2, at 703. 
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 Table 2: Fees Charged by Providers 
NAF 
No. Domain Names Single Panel Three Member Panel 
1 1,150 2,500 
2 1,300 2,600 
3-5 1,400 2,800 
6-10 1,750 3,500 
11-15 2,000 4,000 
16 or more To be Determined To be Determined 
WIPO 
No. Domain Names Single Panel Three Member Panel 
1-5 1,500 4,000 
6-10 2,000 5,000 
More than 10 To be Determined To be Determined 
CPR 
No. Domain Names Single Panel Three Member Panel 
1-2 2,000 4,500 
3-5 2,500 6,000 
More than 6 To be Determined To be Determined 
Source: http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/, http://www.arbforum.com/domains/, 
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_Menu.htm,  
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 From this table, there are two main characteristics we can mention. First, the cost 
of the procedure across providers is not prohibitive and it is much lower than the 
expected costs of resorting to court action to solve the conflict119. Second, the differences 
in prices among providers are not big enough to promote a high substitution among 
providers. For example, the most popular provider is WIPO, which charges a higher fee 
than NAF, which is second in popularity. The fees of WIPO are 16% higher in average 
than NAF’s for those cases in which the number of domain names is between one and 
five. For the cases between six and ten domain names, the difference is just 14% among 
these two providers. In the case of CPR, the difference in price with respect to NAF is 
24% for the cases with one to five domain names. Accordingly, we can conclude that the 
system is providing affordable dispute resolution services without producing a high level 
of competition among providers. 
 
3. Geographical Representation of Arbitrators 
 The third main variable the Providers can manage is the kind of panelists they 
offer to complainants and respondents. In most of the cases, those panelists are former 
judges or lawyers from different countries120. The different background of these panelists 
could have an influence over the final results of their verdicts. This is a very important 
issue on the Internet, were people from different parts of the world are getting in contact 
and doing business. As a result, a common set of rules for the Internet for every user 
around the world should have a correlation with the diversity of the panelists offered by 
each Provider. Of course, we should be aware that those countries with higher levels of 
connectivity to the Internet should have a relative importance in the share of panelists 
they receive. Table 3 shows the distributions of panelists for each Provider across 
countries. 
                                                          
119 “even though the DRP’s fees have already increased by at least 50% in the short time the policy has 
been in operation, it is still regarded as a bargain by trademark holders.” Thornburg, supra note 15, at 204. 
120 See, http://www.udrpinfo.com/panl.php (providing information and profiles of the panelists of the 
UDRP system) 
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 Table 3: Panelists 
     Panelists (% of Total) 
  WIPO NAF CPR Internet Users 
(% World Total) 
WIPO NAF CPR 
Argentina  4 2  0.66 1.2 1.4  
Australia  19 1 1 1.44 5.8 0.7 2.7 
Austria  2 1  0.52 0.6 0.7  
Belgium  5 1  0.64 1.5 0.7  
Brazil  8 3  1.60 2.4 2.2  
Canada  21 7 1 2.69 6.4 5.0 2.7 
Chile  5   0.62 1.5   
China  2 2 1 6.72 0.6 1.4 2.7 
Colombia  2 3  0.23 0.6 2.2  
Croatia  1   0.05 0.3   
Cyprus  1   0.03 0.3   
Czech Republic 3   0.28 0.9   
Denmark  2 1  0.58 0.6 0.7  
Ecuador  1 1  0.07 0.3 0.7  
Egypt  3   0.12 0.9   
Finland  1   0.45 0.3   
France  17 2  3.12 5.2 1.4  
Germany  9   6.14 2.8   
Ghana  1   0.01 0.3   
Greece  2   0.28 0.6   
Hungary  2 1  0.30 0.6 0.7  
India  6 2  1.40 1.8 1.4  
Ireland  2 2  0.18 0.6 1.4  
Israel  5 2  0.36 1.5 1.4  
Italy  10 2 1 3.27 3.1 1.4 2.7 
Jamaica  2   0.02 0.6   
Japan  8 1  11.15 2.4 0.7  
Liechtenstein  1  0.00  0.7  
Malaysia  2 1  1.30 0.6 0.7  
Mexico  6 2  0.72 1.8 1.4  
Netherlands  6   1.58 1.8   
New Zealand  6 1  0.22 1.8 0.7  
Nigeria  1   0.02 0.3   
Norway  4   0.54 1.2   
Pakistan  1   0.10 0.3   
Paraguay   1  0.01  0.7  
Puerto Rico   1  0.12  0.7  
Portugal  3   0.50 0.9   
Republic of 
Korea  
9 5  
4.86 2.8 3.6  
Romania  1   0.20 0.3   
Singapore  6   0.30 1.8   
South Africa  2 1  0.61 0.6 0.7  
Spain  10 3 3 1.47 3.1 2.2 8.1 
Sweden  6 2  0.92 1.8 1.4  
Switzerland  14 2  0.44 4.3 1.4  
Uganda  1 1  0.01 0.3 0.7  
UK  28 2  4.79 8.6 1.4  
US 93 85 30 28.48 28.4 61.2 81.1 
Vietnam   1  0.20  0.7  
Zimbabwe  1     0.02 0.3   
Total 327 139 37     
Source: http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/, http://www.arbforum.com/domains/, 
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_Menu.htm, World Bank Country Indicators, at http://www.worldbank.org/  
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 In this case there are important differences between providers. WIPO is the one 
that has a more diverse group of panelists from both Developed and Less-Developed 
countries, even though countries from the OECD represent 87% of the total panelists and 
account for 75% of Internet users in the World. The most favored countries in WIPO are 
Australia, Canada, France, Spain Switzerland and UK, which account for 33.4% of the 
panelists and just 13.95% of Internet users. The less represented countries, among OECD 
members, are Japan, Germany and Korea, which account for 8% of the panelists and 
22.5% of Internet users. In the case of the United States, the representation in the group 
of panelists is almost equal to the share of Internet users the country has. WIPO is the 
most diversified of the UDRP providers, which could be because of the relationship with 
the United Nations and the need for having a worldwide representation. On the other 
hand, in both CPR and NAF, United States are heavily represented, having most of the 
panelists in the list of both providers. In the next section we will explore the effects 
panelists and specific country cases have on the performance of the providers. 
 One of the regions that is treated unfavorably, as compared with the number of 
Internet users located in this region, in the distribution of panelists is Asia, especially east 
Asia121. This region accounts for 26% of total Internet users, but their representation is 
just 10% (WIPO), 8% (NAF) and 2.4% (CPR). This bias could explain the creation of 
new providers for the East Asian region in 2002122. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 The development of the UDRP system has drawn the attention of many 
researchers since the beginning of the regime in 1999123. The creation of a global dispute 
resolution system that covered the entire gTLDs domain names, and as a consequence 
most of the Internet, was an ambitious task for an environment that was mostly 
                                                          
121 This region includes the following countries: India, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, China (including Hong 
Kong), and Republic of Korea. 
122 See, supra note 104. 
123 See, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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unregulated, except for regulations through code124. Most of the studies about ICANN 
UDRP are devoted to the theoretical debate of the virtues and failures of the system in 
providing effective regulation of Domain Names complaints125. However, there are few 
works designed to evaluate performance of the UDRP with exhaustive empirical analysis. 
One of the first empirical attempts to understand UDRP was done by Milton Mueller at 
Syracuse University126. Professor Mueller constructed a database with most of the data 
concerning the cases evaluated at ICANN UDRP regime127. The first empirical work 
from Professor Mueller is an attempt to describe the performance of the system and 
explain the differences in market share that the providers had128. This work provided 
useful empirical information on the characteristics of the providers and the performance 
of both the system as a whole and individual private providers. From the empirical 
analysis the author concludes that there is a bias in the system, since those providers that 
favored complainants are also the ones that received the higher market share129. As it is 
noted in this work, WIPO and NAF received 61% and 31% of the cases respectively, 
having a winning rate for complainants of 67.5% and 71.5% respectively130. On the other 
hand, eRes, which was more lenient with respondents, had a market share of just 7% with 
a winning rate percentage for complainants of just 44.2%131. However, as Professor 
Mueller notices, the main difference in the winning rates was in those cases in which the 
respondent was in default132. When the respondent contested the complaint the winning 
                                                          
124 “All in all, about 70% of the world’s domain name registrations now fall under the jurisdiction of the 
UDRP. The percentage will probably increase in the future as new top-level domains are introduced by 
ICANN.” Milton Mueller, Rough Justice. An Analysis of ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy. 
Convergence Center, Syracuse University School of Information Studies. 
125 See, supra note 20. 
126 See, supra note 124, and Milton Mueller, Success by Default, A New Profile of Domain Name 
Trademark Disputes under ICANN’s UDRP. Convergence Center, Syracuse University, June 2002. 
127 To access the database see, http://dcc.syr.edu/markle/mhome.htm  
128 Id. 
129 “There is statistical evidence that selection of dispute resolution service providers by challengers leads 
to forum shopping that biases the results.” Id., at 2. 
130 Id., at 11 and 14. 
131 Id. 
132 “The high default rate can be interpreted in two opposing ways. Either the UDRP procedure moves too 
fast for ordinary domain name registrants to receive notice or to defend themselves adequately, or many of 
the challenged names were abandoned by registrants, who saw little point in defending them. We tend 
toward the latter interpretation, without ruling out the possibility that a significant minority of cases fall 
into the former category. We found a small number of cases with late responses, but many panelists 
accepted the late submissions or delayed the proceedings to obtain a response.” Id., at 12. 
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percentage for complainant was 43% eRes, 50% NAF and 54% WIPO133. This work also 
presents an econometric analysis of the cases concluding that the share of the market that 
NAF and WIPO received depended on their influence over the U.S. and rest of the world 
respectively, while for eRes the market share was determined by the high complainant 
loss rate134. The main conclusions of this work are that the system is biased towards the 
complainants and that eRes low market share is due to the fact that respondents are 
favored by this provider135. The author also proposed some changes in the system in 
order to avoid forum shopping136. Nonetheless, the results of this research effort have 
been strongly criticized by an INTA report137. This report notes major flaws in Professor 
Mueller’s analysis like misunderstandings in the functioning of UDRP, inappropriate 
statistical evidence to support the claims of bias, inadequate review of UDRP cases, lack 
of analysis and data showing the rate of challenges to UDRP decisions, disputed domain 
name are a small percentage of total domain names and UDRP effect of discouraging 
registrations that infringe domain names138. According to this report, Professor Mueller’s 
analysis “distorts facts and missuses statistics to achieve a predetermined end –to show 
that the UDRP is somehow biased in favor of trademark owners and does harm the 
domain name system.”139
 Professor Michael Geist provides another major piece of empirical evidence on 
the ICANN UDRP system140. His work is based on the analysis of general data from 
UDRP cases. His conclusions are similar to Professor Mueller’s, finding evidence of bias 
and forum shopping among providers. Furthermore, the author finds that panel 
performance is quite different if we separate them in one member and three-member 
                                                          
133 Id., at 12. 
134 Id., at 18. 
135 Id. 
136 “To remedy the bias inherent in complainant forum shopping, ICANN should modify the UDRP to 
allow domain name registrars to select the dispute resolution provider(s) who will handle disputes over 
names they register. The incentives of registrars are more balanced because end users have a choice of 
which registrar to use. Registrar selection compares favorably to other possible remedies, such as random 
assignment of cases to dispute resolution service providers, an appeal process, or modification of the 
language of the policy.” Id., at 2. 
137 Ned Branthover, UDRP – A Success Story: A Rebuttal to the Analysis and Conclusions of Professor 
Milton Mueller in “Rough Justice.” International Trademark Association (INTA) Internet Committee, 
May, 2002. 
138 Id., at 1-2. 
139 Id., at 10. 
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panels141. This work shows that in the case of panel composition, three-member panels 
offer a lower winning rate for complainants: 62% (WIPO), 49%(NAF) and 50% (eRes) 
for three-member panels versus 83% (WIPO), 86%(NAF) and 64%(eRes) in the case of 
single member panels142. Accordingly, the main proposal derived from this work is that 
simply changing to a mandatory three-member panel regime, the system bias will be 
reduced143. However, this work has been strongly criticized by INTA144. The critical 
review claimed that Professor Geist’s work are based on simple statistical analysis of the 
cases without offering adequate measuring for fairness. Besides, it does not consider the 
default cases in the calculation of the winning percentage for complainants; it does not 
analyze other causes that could justify high winning percentage ratio; neither does it 
consider that forum selection can be the result of other factors such as quality and 
reputation, costs, etc, rather than bias145. Both INTA’s reports criticize the assumption of 
Geist and Muller that a 50% winning rate for complainants and respondents should be the 
norm. They assert that the UDRP was created to solve the problem of abusive registration 
and then a higher winning rate for complainants than for respondents should be the 
expected norm146. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
140 Michael Geist, supra note 20 and Michael Geist, Fundamentally Fair.com? An Update on Bias 
Allegations and the ICANN UDRP. University of Ottawa, at http://www.lawbytes.ca  
141 “At least three factors contribute to the greater confidence in the three-person panel. First, this panel 
configuration eliminates the possibility that a single panelist may simply misinterpret the UDRP and render 
the wrong decision. Second, the three-person panel forces panelists to more carefully consider their 
decision by justifying it before their counterparts on the panel. … Third, and most importantly, the three-
member panel completely alters the panelist selection process. In a single panel case, the arbitration 
provider is exclusively responsible for allocating the case to a panelist. Conversely, in a three member 
panel, the arbitration provider wields comparatively little influence over the selection process. Both the 
complainant and respondent are typically allowed to select one of the three panel members by submitting a 
list of three or five acceptable candidates of which the provider will select one. The provider selects the 
third member of the panel, but only after it has provided both the complainant and respondent with the 
opportunity to indicate which panelist they prefer.” Geist, 2001, supra note 18, at 22. 
142 Id., at 19. 
143 “Rather than focusing on provider selection as a means of solving the forum shopping issue, ICANN 
must turn its attention to panelist selection. If providers continue to maintain exclusive and unchecked 
authority over the selection of panelists in 90% of all the cases, no reform of the rules nor to how a provider 
is selected will remove the potential for bias in panelist allocation.” Id., at 28. 
144 INTA, The UDRP by All Accounts Works Effectively. Rebuttal to Analysis and Conclusions of Professor 
Michael Geist in “Fair.com?” and “Fundamentally Fair.com?”. International Trademark Association, 
INTA Internet Committee, May 2002. 
145 Id., at 2. 
146 “At one point in Fair.com, Professor Geist asserts that “only one panelist had a respondent winning 
percentage under 50%”. The use of the word “only” and the use of 50% as a point of reference suggest that 
Professor Geist is treating 50% as “the norm”. However, 50% is not a norm for litigation; 50% is a norm 
for probability.” Id., at 3. 
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 Finally, the last major piece of empirical work on ICANN is the exhaustive work 
of Anne Kur at the Max-Plank-Institute147. This paper shows an excellent empirical 
description of the performance of the UDRP system, taking into account the most 
disparate variables and characteristics of the panels’ decisions. The main conclusion of 
the work is that “[g]enerally speaking, the survey shows that fears concerning the risk 
that the policy might be misused by large companies in order to freeze competition and 
free speech are largely unfounded. In the vast majority of the cases considered, the 
domain name at stake was identical with, or incorporated, or otherwise clearly resembled 
the trademark belonging to someone else, and whenever the respondent could make out a 
plausible case of bona fide business interests or fair use, chances were good that the 
complaint would be rejected. Only a rather small amount of cases could be identified 
where issues such as reverse hijacking or critical comments on the rightowisner’s product 
or business conduct, etc. were involved. On the other hand, a more detailed analysis of 
the cases or groups of cases reveals that several issues still need further clarification. In 
other words: although UDRP is functioning well as a matter of principle, there are certain 
points where the picture becomes somewhat unclear.”148
 This empirical work presents the latest addition to the analysis of ICANN UDRP. 
Most of the theoretical debate nowadays is based in the assumption that the main variable 
that matters in explaining users and provider behavior in this regime is the provider bias 
towards complainants149. As we will show in the next sections, even though bias is 
important, the performance of each provider can be more important in determining the 
users’ choice of provider. In this respect, our work offers a richer empirical analysis, 
looking at the different factors that explain the performance of the UDRP. Furthermore, 
as we demonstrate, there are other variables, like efficiency of the providers, which help 
to explain the process of selection better than the argued bias toward complainants. As a 
consequence, the aim of our work is to reevaluate the claims of the main empirical works 
and to provide a more accurate explanation of the performance of the UDRP. 
                                                          
147 Annette Kur, UDRP. Max-Plack-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and 
Competition Law, Munich and Institute for Intellectual Property Law and Market Law, University of 
Stockholm, Institute for Information Law, Technical University of Karlsruhe, at 
http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/Online-Publikationen/2002/UDRP-study-final-02.pdf. 
148 Id., at 57-58. 
149 See, supra note 20. 
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V. ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
As we seen in the previous section, the UDRP system is strictly controlled by 
ICANN through the implementation of the general policy. The guidelines and rules 
enacted by ICANN are the ones that should be applied in each UDRP case, and every 
provider should abide to them. As a result, the system has a common policy that should 
make every private court similar to each other in terms of decisions and performance. 
Given that the general rules are fixed by ICANN, the other two main variables that can 
affect the performance of the system are the price charged in each case, and the quickness 
of the procedure. First, as analyzed in the previous section, prices charged by each 
provider are not different enough to generate a bias favoring any of the providers and 
then, there is no evidence of price competition in the system. Second, time duration of 
each case is the only variable each provider can use to differentiate from the other 
providers. Furthermore, the duration of the trial has been one of the main factors for the 
existence of the UDRP150. The creation of a cheap and fast procedure for conflict 
resolution was one of the main objectives of ICANN. The duration of the trial will 
depend on the specific technology each provider is using in deciding their cases. In 
general, for both complainants and defendants, a faster system will be preferred to a 
slower one, given that both providers have a uniform and independent review system151. 
The duration of the trial will depend on the general characteristics of each provider, as 
well as the characteristics of the case presented. In this section we explore some 
regression models to determine the characteristics of the UDRP system as a whole, and of 
each provider. 
 
 
                                                          
150 “The UDRP also succeeds in being a process that resolves disputes quickly. Most of the cases are 
disposed of within the allotted times, which are themselves very short. The ability to transmit information 
electronically undoubtedly adds to the speed of the process. While the process achieves speed by allowing 
very little input and by limiting the issues involved, it must be said that speed was the drafters’ primary 
goal and it was successfully accomplished. Note, however, that this speed is far more likely to benefit the 
complainant than the respondent.” Thornburg, supra note 14, at 204-205. 
151 See, Froomkin, supra note 2, at 675 (discussing the problem of allowing short time for the case os small 
firms and consumer responses.) 
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A. ARE COMPLAINANTS SELECTING PROVIDERS BY BIAS OR EFFICIENCY? 
 
 Most empirical analysis of the UDRP has focused on the analysis of the cases for 
each provider and the differences among them. Some of the most complete empirical 
works are the presented by Geist (2001), Mueller (2001) and Kur (2002), who present 
evidence on the differences in treatment of private firms and individuals in the UDRP 
regime152. Mueller (2001) contends that the UDRP is biased in favor of the private firms, 
which are favored most of the time. Furthermore, the provider that had favored 
consumers and individuals lost market share and went bankrupt153. Kurt’s interesting 
study also described the performance of the UDRP in terms of the results from the cases 
presented. Nonetheless, these studies are showing only part of the empirical evidence, 
and their analysis is mostly based in descriptive statistics of the system. The use of simple 
statistics and the lack of qualitative analysis have been the most important critiques to 
Geist and Muller’s works by the International Trademark Association154. In short, the 
main critiques to these studies are the reliance in ex-post analysis, looking at the results 
of the UDRP and analyzing the presence of bias favoring complaints. Second, these 
analyses are based on simple statistics describing the results of the model, without clear 
model testing of the thesis of the authors. In this paper we will look at an important 
measure of efficiency, as we will try to understand the technology behind each of these 
providers. This analysis, based on econometric techniques, will provide better tools for 
determining the actual functioning of the UDRP system. We will look at some of the 
questions posed by these empirical studies but we will go further to look at productivity 
conditions of each provider. The performance of the providers has been overlooked in 
                                                          
152 See, Mueller, supra note 124, Geist, supra note 20 and Kur, Annette, UDRP, supra note 147  
153 See, Section III. 
“The Fair.com study concluded by arguing that there was .compelling evidence that forum shopping has 
become an integral part of the UDRP and that the system may indeed be biased in favor of trademark 
holders..28  In the seven months since the release of that study, evidence to that effect has continued to 
mount, while the explanations of UDRP supporters have been proven incorrect.  With eResolution now in 
bankruptcy court, NAF granting an ever-larger share of its caseload to a small group of panelists, and the 
red herring of defaults vs. non-defaults conclusively disproved, the need for ICANN UDRP reform has 
become increasingly urgent.” Geist, supra note 20, at 8-9. 
“Moreover, the fact that eResolutions is now in bankruptcy may have been due to a number of factors 
wholly unrelated to alleged forum shopping.” International Trademark Association, supra note 137 at 7. 
154 INTA Internet Committee, supra notes 137 and 144. 
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most of the studies about UDRP, which are based in ex-post analysis of the results155. 
Most studies critique the high ratio of cases in which complainants win the case as an 
indicator of the bias of the system. Furthermore, they assert that the higher ratio of 
complainants winning the cases will induce future complainants to forum shopping, 
selecting those providers with higher winning percentage. Nonetheless, these studies do 
not mention what should be a fair ratio of complainants winning the cases and, more 
importantly, there is no testing of the choices complainants faced at the moment of 
selecting the provider. In this section we would like to develop an ex-ante model, 
explaining complainants’ behavior at the moment of selecting the provider. From our 
previous analysis we assume that the price variable is not significative in selecting the 
provider. Accordingly, there are two main motives of each complainant for choosing a 
provider. First, complainants can choose a provider based on the bias favoring the 
complainants. This has been the usual thesis on the analysis of the UDRP system. 
Second, complainants are also willing to choose the provider that is most efficient in 
handling the case, and will generate a shorter waiting time. This is an efficiency motive 
for choosing providers, which has been neglected in the literature about the UDRP. 
Accordingly, we assume that each complainant (or consumer) who has a complaint will 
pick a provider j from a set of J providers at time i and the utility derived from this choice 
is given by a random utility model, 
 
(1)                                                 ' ijijij zU εβ +=  
 
Where Uij is the utility of complainant i for choosing provider j, and i=1,…,n and 
j=1,…,m; 
 β’ is a vector of the coefficient for the vector of explanatory variables zij for each 
consumer; and 
εij is an error term. 
 
                                                          
155 See, supra note 20 for a list of the studies about ICANN and UDRP. 
 40
According to equation 1 if the complainant makes the choice j, we assume that Uij is the 
maximum among the possible utilities derived from the rest of the providers in the set J. 
As a result, the statistical model is driven by the probability that choice j is made, which 
is, 
 
(2)                    jkother  allfor              )(Pr ≠> ikij UUob  
 
Accordingly, given a random variable that represents the choice made by complainants, 
Yi, then the probability can be expressed as, 
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this model is the conditional logit model. In our case, the dependent variable Yij is given 
by the selection each complainant had done in the UDRP system. The providers are NAF, 
WIPO and eRes, i.e. J=3. The explanatory variables that determine the probability that a 
given utility under a given provider is bigger than the utility of any of the other one, are 
the two main characteristics of each providers, the bias favoring complainants, 
represented by the ratio of cases that have been won by complainants in each provider, 
and the efficiency of each provider, measured by the average duration of the cases 
managed by each provider. According with this model, we are evaluating the probability 
of each complainant of choosing the provider based on these two measures of the 
performance of the providers. We find that this model is more suitable to analyze the 
causes of the preference for some providers with respect to others, than simply looking at 
the ex-post results of the system and elaborating some suitable explanation for such 
result. 
 We have calculated a complete series of different indicators for the bias and the 
efficiency measures. First, for the bias indicator we have the following variables: 
Complaint: is the ratio of cases won by the complainants since the beginning of the 
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provider’s operations and up to the day the complainant is presenting the case to a 
provider. It has been calculated in a daily basis from January 2000 to November 2002. 
Monthly Complaint: is the ratio of cases won by the complainants in the current month 
the complaint is being presented. 
Monthly Complaint Lagged: is the same measure than the previous one, but lagged one 
month. 
All these variables have been calculated for each provider. 
Duration: is the natural logarithm of the average duration of the cases for each provider 
since the beginning of the operations of the provider. It has been calculated daily from 
January 2000 to November 2003. 
Monthly Duration: is the natural logarithm of the average duration of the cases for each 
provider in the current month the case is being presented to a provider. 
Monthly Duration Lagged: is the same measure than the previous one, but lagged one 
month. 
 
Accordingly, we are going to test if the probability of selecting one of the providers 
depended on the bias with respect to complainants or the efficiency of the provider in 
handling the cases. In order to be sure the relationship of the election of provider and 
these variables we have tested a series of similar models using the variables mentioned 
before156. The dependent variable, Provider, represents the selection of the provider made 
by each claimant. Table 4 shows the results of our regression models. 
                                                          
156 See Appendix A for the summary of the variables used in the regression analysis. 
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 Table 4: Multinomial Regression 
Model 1 
Variables Coefficient z 
NAF 
Cmeresl 
1.956 
(0.649) 3.013(***)
Cmwipol 
6.879 
(2.113) 3.256(**)
Ldnaf 
-8.014 
(2.370) -3.382(***)
Ldwipol 
3.953 
(0.598) 6.605(***)
Lderes 
4.001 
(0.723) 5.537(***)
Constant 
-6.190 
(8.296) -0.746 
WIPO 
Cmeresl 
2.463 
(0.621) 3.968(***)
Cmwipol 
3.994 
(2.024) 1.973(**)
Ldnaf 
-6.967 
(2.309) -3.017(***)
Ldwipol 
5.009 
(0.579) 8.644(***)
Lderes 3.879 (0.714) 5.433
(***)
Cons 
-11.200 
(8.081) -1.386 
Number of observations=2861 
LR chi2(10)=121.78 
Prob > chi2=0.0000 
Log Likelihood= -2255.66 
Pseudo R2= 0.0238 
Coefficient tests: (***) Significative 1% 
                             (**) Significative 5% 
                             (*) Significative 10% 
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  According to this model the explanatory variables we considered for the provider 
selection are the ratio of complainants winning the cases in each provider during the 
current month in which the complainant was presented (Cmnaf, Cmwipo and Cmeres) 
and the lagged variables (Cmnafl, Cmwipol and Cmeresl), and the natural logarithm of 
the average duration of the cases in each provider, also for the current month (Ldnaf, 
Ldwipo and Lderes), and the lagged variables (Ldnafl, Ldwipol and Lderesl). As we can 
see only the complainant and variables for WIPO and eRes lagged one month are 
significative in this model. In the case of the duration variables, the variables for NAF 
and eRes for the current month are significative and the lagged monthly duration for 
WIPO. Now, we would like to see the magnitude of the impact of each variable in the 
probability of selection. Table 5 shows the probabilities calculated by the model and the 
effects of changing each of the explanatory variables in one deviation standard. 
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 Table 5: Probabilities Model 1 
  Prob (NAF) % Change Prob (WIPO) % Change Prob (eRes) % Change 
Total Probability 0.268  0.685 0.047 
Cmeresl Increase 0.254 -5.22% 0.716 4.5% 0.030 -36.2% 
 Decrease 0.280 4.5% 0.650 -5.1% 0.071 51.1% 
Cmwipol Increase 0.304 13.4% 0.660 -3.64% 0.036 -23.4% 
 Decrease 0.166 -38.1% 0.791 15.5% 0.043 -8.5% 
Ldnafl Increase 0.221 -17.5% 0.658 -3.9% 0.121 157.4% 
 Decrease 0.307 14.6% 0.676 -5.5% 0.016 -66.0% 
Ldwipol Increase 0.238 -11.2% 0.741 8.1% 0.020 -57% 
 Decrease 0.288 7.4% 0.608 -11.2% 0.103 120% 
Lderes Increase 0.281 4.9% 0.699 2.0% 0.019 -60.0% 
 Decrease 0.246 -8.2% 0.647 -5.5% 0.108 129.8% 
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According with these results, there is a much higher probability of the complainants in 
selecting WIPO than NAF and eRes, at least for the time span of this study, which 
comprehends all the days in which eRes was still receiving cases. In the case of NAF –
column 1 Table 5- the probability of being selected is 26.8%. An increase (decrease) in 
the ratio of complainants winning in eRes will slightly increase (decrease) the probability 
of complainants selecting NAF. Even though the impact is small, it is in the opposite 
direction. One should expect that if there is a bias, an increase in the winning ratio of 
complainants in eRes should depress the probability of receiving a case for NAF and 
WIPO. In this case, the findings go in the opposite direction since an increase in the bias 
favoring complainants by eRes will produce an increase in the number of complainants 
presented in NAF. The same result is found for NAF in the case of a change in the 
complainant winning ratio for WIPO. In this case an increase (decrease) will result in an 
important increase (decrease) in the probability of cases received by NAF. Again, these 
results are counterintuitive with respect to the thesis presented before. If we look at the 
effect of the duration time on the probability of NAF, we have the following results. An 
increase (decrease) in the duration of NAF procedure will decrease (increase) the 
probability of NAF receiving the next case. The effect of this variable is more important 
than the effect of the bias variables and more importantly, it is according to what we 
should expect; i.e. a worsening in the efficiency of NAF should decrease the probability 
of receiving the next claim. In the case of the duration in eRes, the sign of the changes are 
also as expected, a higher (lower) duration in eRes produces a higher (lower) probability 
of selection in NAF, increasing (decreasing) the probability of receiving a claim. 
Nonetheless, in the case of the duration variable for WIPO, the results are 
counterintuitive. An increase (decrease) in the duration for WIPO will produce a decrease 
(increase) in the probability of receiving a case in NAF. Looking at the results for WIPO, 
the probability of being selected is the highest, 68.5%. In this case, an increase (decrease) 
in the complainant ratio in eRes will produce a slightly negative (positive) effect in the 
probability of WIPO, which is again a result contrary to what should be expected. The 
same happens with the changes in the complainant ratio in WIPO, which have a negative 
impact in WIPO probability. Accordingly, all the results testing for bias in WIPO are 
against the claim of the existence of such a bias. In the case of duration, the results are the 
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following: both an increase and decrease in the duration of NAF will produce a negative 
impact in the probability of receiving cases by WIPO. Nonetheless, it is worth to mention 
than the negative effect is more important in the case where the duration of NAF 
procedure decreases, which is consistent with the efficiency argument. Nonetheless, the 
effect of its own duration is not consistent with what we should expect. An increase 
(decrease) in the duration of WIPO will increase (decrease) the probability of receiving 
the next case. Finally, the duration of eRes have the expected effect in the probability of 
WIPO. In the case of eRes, the probability of receiving a case is the lowest of the three 
providers studied. An increase (decrease) in the complainant bias by eRes has a negative 
(positive) effect in the probability of receiving the next case, which is again 
counterintuitive. However, in the case of the bias variable for WIPO, both an increase 
and decrease in this variable generates a negative effect in the probability of eRes. This 
effect is more importantly in the case in which the bias of WIPO increases, which is 
according to what we should expect. The impact of the efficiency variable in eRes is very 
important. An increase (decrease) in the duration of NAF generates an important increase 
in the probability of eRes. However, the results are not as expected in the case of the 
efficiency measure for WIPO. In the case of eRes own efficiency, the results are as we 
should expect, and the size is very important. Summarizing, Table 6 shows the expected 
and actual signs of the results obtained in our model. 
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 Table 6: Expected and Actual Results 
NAF WIPO eRes Variables 
Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual 
Cmeresl Increase - (-) - + + - 
 Decrease + (+) + - - + 
Cmwipol Increase - + + - - (-) 
 Decrease + - - + + - 
Ldnafl Increase - (-) + (-) + (+) 
 Decrease + (+) - - - (-) 
Ldwipol Increase + - - + + - 
 Decrease - + + - - + 
Lderes Increase + (+) + (+) - (-) 
 Decrease - (-) - (-) + (+) 
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From the results in Table 6, we can see that the bias variables produced partial results, 
with just one case in which the signs are the expected ones. However, in the case of 
efficiency variables, the results are as expected in all the cases for NAF and eRes. The 
only variable that is not according to what we expected is the efficiency measure for 
WIPO. Summarizing, the performance of the providers can be considered a better 
measure in determining the selection of the providers by the complaints than the 
supposed bias of the system favoring complaints. Accordingly, differently from most of 
the empirical papers about the UDRP system, which were based on general results and 
supporting the bias theory, in our paper we look at the performance of the providers, and 
how differences among them affect the results of the UDRP. According to our results, the 
study of the performance should be given more attention than the supposed bias of the 
system, given that performance is a more important determinant of the success of the 
provider than bias. In the next sections we develop a comprehensive empirical study of 
the performance of each provider, looking at the specific particularities of the UDRP 
regime. 
 
 
B. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 According to the analysis from the previous section, each provider for the UDRP 
system has to evaluate and decide on each complainant that is presented to them157. The 
two main characteristics ICANN tried to give to this alternative dispute resolution system 
are low cost and fast results. The low cost of presenting a complaint, as shown in the 
previous section, is not too different among providers. In the case of the speed of the 
procedure, ICANN tried to generate a simple set of rules for processing each complaint, 
which should generate a short lived administrative act. By providing common rules for 
the process, ICANN sought to avoid excessive differentiation among providers and forum 
shopping. Nonetheless, the providers still have different instruments for improving with 
respect to the other providers and then to attract more complaints: First, given that it is 
the complainant the one who chooses the provider, a biased favoring complainants would 
                                                          
157 See Sections II and III. 
 49
help to deviate complaints toward this provider. This effect has been widely analyzed in 
the literature but, as we showed in the previous sections, it does not seem to be the main 
determinant of the selection of provider by the claimants. Second, Providers can increase 
business by shaping their supplemental rules in a more efficient way than other providers. 
As explained in the previous section, supplemental rules do not vary much among 
providers. Third, prices could be used to attract more complainants. However, prices are 
similar among providers. This effect is similar to other oligopolistics industries, where 
producers do not compete through prices but through the quality of the services offered to 
consumers. Most of these variables will determine the speed of the process, which in the 
end is one of the main characteristics of the system, and the success of the Provider in the 
long run. The time that takes each complaint to be evaluated and decided depends on a 
number of instruments the provider has at hand: First, it depends on the bias of the 
provider. Bias for or against some group will determine a different kind of process and 
also differences in timing. For example, if a given Provider favors people from a given 
country, then all the complaints or responses coming from this country will have different 
treatment and, as a consequence, different speed of resolution. Second, differences in the 
supplemental rules, and or internal procedure for each provider will determine the 
capacity of doing a fast job in reviewing the complaints. For example, if a provider has 
created simple rules with good incentives for both complainants and respondents for 
submitting accurate and on time information, then the resolutions of the cases will be 
faster. Third, the type of complaints and procedure will have an impact on the speed of 
the process. For example, if the respondent fails to send a defense for its case, then the 
panelist will be more able to reach a faster decision. Fourth, the panelists the Provider is 
appointing and their specific background and precedence will have an impact on the 
speed of the results. For example, a panelist from India will be more knowledgeable of 
property laws in India and more able to quickly handle a case involving parties from 
India than considering a case with parties coming from the European Union. Fifth, the 
geographical precedence of the parties should have an impact on the speed of the 
resolution of the conflict. Differences in law, language, costumes, etc., will be a barrier to 
generate a smooth and fast resolution in each case. This is one of the main barriers a 
universal system like the UDRP has to be able to overcome in order to be successful in 
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the long run. As a result, the duration of the procedure will be influenced by the many 
instruments each provider has to be more efficient than the others and be able to improve 
their share of cases. Accordingly, we can represent the speed of the procedure as, 
 
(1)                                                               ),,,,( PartiesPanelistsTypeRulesBiasDd =  
 
where: Bias is the specific preference the Provider has with respect to some specific 
group; 
 Rules, are the differences in the procedure and rules of each Provider 
 Type, is the type and complexity of each complaint 
 Panelists, represents individual characteristics of each panelist 
 Parties, represents the precedence of each party. 
 
In this equation, the duration of the procedure will depend on the series of variables under 
control of the Provider. The analysis of this duration function will help to determine the 
differences between providers and the different factors that explain the performance of 
the UDRP system. In this aspect, our analysis departs from most of the empirical studies 
of the UDRP. These studies have been devoted to determine the bias of the system in 
favor of complainants and general characteristics of the providers. Our analysis goes a 
step beyond that, by looking at the determinants of the duration of the process, which, as 
analyzed before, is one of the main measures of efficiency of the system. 
 
C. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
According to the analysis we did with regards to the UDRP system, we use duration 
models to test the performance of each provider and the system as a whole. Duration 
models have been widely used in medicine and labor economics, to measure the expected 
length, measured in time, of an event. For example, in labor economics, researchers have 
been interested in measuring the probability of duration for a strike. As the strike goes on, 
there is a probability that it will end the very next day, or it will continue for an extra day. 
These models measure the probability that the strike will be maintained an extra day. 
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Accordingly we use this model in the case of the UDRP. Once a trial begins, there is a 
probability that it will be terminated the next day or else it will continue to be analyzed 
by the respective provider. 
 
Data 
 We use two different databases for the cases of the four providers, WIPO, NAF, 
eRes and CPR, for the period January 2000 to November 2002. The first database utilized 
in this section was obtained from the UDRP web site and it comprehends 7148 cases 
from January 200 to November 2002. The cases are separated by provider and by the 
duration, in days, of each case. The second database was obtained from the work of the 
Convergence Center158. This database comprehends a series of variables for the first 3850 
cases from December 1999 to July 2001159. From this database we have been able to 
compile a series of different variables as described in Appendix B. 
 
D. DURATION MODELS 
 Let’s introduce the duration model and its relationship with our case of the 
UDRP. In our case, let’s define the random variable T which is the failure time for the 
cases of the UDRP, i.e. T represents how many days take each case to be decided by a 
given provider. The distribution function of T is defined as F(t) and density f(t)160. 
Accordingly, we define the survival function of T as, 
 
(2)                                                                                         )Pr()(1)( tTtFtS >=−=  
 
Equation (1) tells us that S(t) is the probability of t being greater than t, i.e. the 
probability that the final decision of the case (failure) will occur after time t161. Now, lets 
                                                          
158 See, http://dcc.syr.edu/projectlist.htm  
159 See, http://dcc.syr.edu/marklepage.htm  
160 This section is based in the following literature of Duration Models: Dick London, SURVIVAL MODELS 
AND THEIR ESTIMATION. Third Edition, ACTEX Publications Winsted, Connecticut, 1997; STATA, 
STATA REFERENCES MANUAL RELEASE 6. Volume 3, Stata Press, College Station, Texas, 1999; William 
Greene, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS. Third Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1997; R. G. Miller, SURVIVAL 
ANALYSIS, Wiley, 1981. 
161 Observe that F(t)=Pr(T<t) and thus, 
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define the conditional density of failure at time t, which is the conditional instantaneous 
measure of failure at time t, given survival to time t. This measure is called the hazard 
rate, and is denoted λ(t). The hazard rate considers the following question: given that the 
case has lasted under a provider revision until time t, what is the probability that it will 
end in the next short interval of time ∆? Then, 
 
(3)                         
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finally, the integrated hazard function (cumulative hazard function) is given by, 
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From this theoretical background there are several definitions for the distribution of the 
variable T like the Constant, Exponential, Weibull, Lognormal and log-logistic 
distributions. These are called parametric models of survival analysis. One of the most 
important drawbacks of these models is the imposed structure on the data, which could 
distort the estimated hazard rates. Instead, we will use non-parametric and semi-
parametric models, which are less restrictive over the characteristics of the data. First we 
use the Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator, which is a strictly empirical approach to 
survival and hazard function estimation. Let’s assume that the observations on duration 
are sorted in ascending order, so that t1>t2. Then we can represent the survival function as 
follows, 
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as an estimate of pi we could use 
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Then, the survival function can be estimated as, 
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This estimator satisfies several nice requirements like it is consistent, asymptotically 
normal, it is generalized MLE and without censoring it is the empirical distribution 
function. 
 In the second part of our analysis we resort to the Cox semi-parametric duration 
model, which is called Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model. This model allowed the 
regression with covariates to determine the hazard rate but it is not as restrictive as other 
parametric models. In this case we have a vector of covariates for each unit of analysis, 
xi. The crucial assumption of the Cox model is, 
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the survival function is the following, 
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The parameter estimates β are obtained by maximizing the following partial log-
likelihood function, 
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where j is the index for the ordered failure times t(j) (j=1,…,D), Dj is the set of dj 
observations that fail at time t(j), dj is the number of failures at t(j), and Rj is the set of 
observations k that are at risk at time t(j) (i.e. all k such that t0i<t(j)<ti).162
E. RESULTS 
 
The UDRP was created in 1999 and immediately attracted the attention of Internet 
users, especially business. This was the first attempt of a dispute system with the global 
reach to comprehend most of the Internet. As a consequence, providers have been busy 
evaluating the most diverse complaints. The evolution of the total number of cases 
presented in each month is depicted in Figure 2. As we can see, there was a sharp 
increase in the number of complaints presented during the initial months of 2000, which 
could be a consequence of the implementation of the UDRP regime itself163. Form 
                                                          
162 From these estimation, the baseline hazard is obtained as h0(t(j))=1-αj is the solution of 
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163 “If we examine when the names challenged under the UDRP were registered, we find a significant 
concentration of challenged names in the first quarter of 2000. .. The first quarter of 2000 stands out as a 
huge peak. The period was too early for the UDRP to have a significant deterrent effect on cybersquatters, 
yet immediately followed ICANN’s introduction of registrar competition which stimulated the marketing 
and consumption of gTLD domains. The number of disputed names drops off precipitously in the second 
and third quarters of 2000.” Mueller, supra note 20, at 5. 
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August 2000 the number of cases steadily decreased throughout 2001. In 2002, there was 
a short jump in the number of cases from March to June, but afterwards the number of 
cases continued to decline. This declining tendency in the number of cases can be the 
consequence of two main factors: First, as most of the disputes associated with earlier 
domain names were already settled during 2000 and part of 2001, the incoming number 
of disputes is much lower. Furthermore, the existence of the UDRP system can act as a 
deterrence mechanism for users engaged in mass registration of names or in looking for 
fast profits from register already proprietary names and brands. Second, the economic 
downturn of the technology related economic activities, especially in what respects to e-
commerce, could have an impact on the number of complaints and disputes for domain 
names. Nonetheless, it is expected that the number of disputes should increase in the 
future, as the Internet is becoming a more international environment and it becomes more 
popular in other countries besides the United States and the European Union.  
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 Figure 2 
UDRP Number of Cases per Month
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 During the period of time between January 200 and June 2003, the UDRP have evaluated 
8,549 cases, and most of them have been divided among two main providers, NAF and 
WIPO (Figure 3). As Figure 3 shows, WIPO and NAF have decided 95.5% of the cases. 
The closest follower, with just 3.3%, eRes, is no longer a provider for UDRP regime. 
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 Figure 3 
Total Number of Cases by Provider
 (January 2000 to June 2003)
39.2%
56.3%
0.9%
3.3% 0.4%
Naf
Wipo
CPR
eRes
ADNDRC
 
 
 59
If we look at the evolution of the number of cases received by each provider through 
time, we can see how the system evolved around two main providers (Figure 4). During 
the first year we can appreciate the dominance of WIPO, which was an active participant 
in the process of delineating the UDRP. Accordingly, the number of cases received by 
WIPO (60% of the total) strongly surpassed those of NAF (32%), eRes (7.6%) and CPR 
(0.7%). In the second year, this tendency is maintained, with WIPO receiving 60% of the 
cases, but now NAF increases its participation to 37% thanks to a reduction in the 
number of cases of eRes to 3.4%. Meanwhile, CPR stood at 0.6%. In 2002 the tendency 
changed as we observe a convergence in the number of cases between NAF and WIPO. 
NAF increased its participation to 46% and WIPO decreased its own to 52%. At the same 
time eRes went out of business in the end of 2001 and CPR continued to having an 
insignificant share. In 2002 ADNDRC is created, but it manages just 0.8% of the total 
number of cases. Finally, in 2003, this tendency continues, with the two main providers 
polarizing the cases. Now WIPO received 50% of the cases, NAF 46%, CPR 1.6% and 
ADNDRC 2%. In this situation, the system seems to have reached equilibrium with two 
main providers receiving an almost similar quantity of cases. In the future it is expected 
that the new provider, ADNDRC, will increase the number of cases, as it has been 
granted an exclusive geographic region of operations. 
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 Figure 4 
UDRP Number of Cases per Month
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If we look at the actual duration of cases from month to month, we can see that there 
were almost no differences in the duration of the cases along time (Figure 5). There were 
some outliers at the initial stages of the system, but then most of the months show in 
average similar values for the duration. 
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 Figure 5 
Duration of Cases by Month
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With this general description of the data and the evolution of the system, in the next 
section we present the econometric results on the performance of the UDRP system. 
 
F. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
As explained in the previous section, we would like to analyze the process of deciding a 
case under the UDRP regime. In this section we study the duration of a case, i.e. what are 
the factors that determine the expected number of days a case is under review. Tho 
answer this question is very important, since this is one of the main variables providers 
can manage to reach their objectives, i.e. to be selected by the complainants as their 
provider. First, we present the results obtained based on the database covering the months 
from January 2000 to November 2002. With this sample we would like to answer two 
main questions: First, which is the general duration characteristics of the system as a 
whole? Second, are there differences in duration among providers? The first question will 
help to describe the procedure and determine the expected duration times of the system as 
a whole. In evaluating the second question we are looking at a more interesting issue, 
which is forum shopping. One of the main objectives of ICANN has been to establish a 
system with many private providers, but a common set of rules and regulations, in order 
to ensure all the parties a similar treatment with any provider. Since it is the complainant 
the one that picks the provider, differences among them can determine a bias that could 
be exploited by the complainants. Accordingly, if the duration time, which depends on 
many factors and characteristics of each provider, results to be different for each 
provider, then we are in the presence of structural differences among them and, as a 
result, forum shopping opportunities can be exploited. Nonetheless, if we find that the 
duration functions are statistically the same among providers, then the system designed 
by ICANN would have proved to be successful in providing a homogeneous system for 
dispute resolution on the Internet. 
In order to analyze the performance of the system Figure 6 shows the Kaplan-Meyer 
survival function. The horizontal axis measures the duration of the cases in days, and the 
vertical axis shows the probability of surviving one extra day. Accordingly, the expected 
mean duration for the whole system is 54 days (Table 7). Furthermore, if we look at 
different probabilities of survival we have the following results, up to 31 days the 
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probability of survival is higher than 90%, up to 40 days it is higher than 70%, for a 
duration of 47 days the probability is higher than 50%, the probability of survival is 
higher than 30% for duration above 56 days, finally for duration of up to 83 days, the 
probability of survival is at least 10%. 
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 Figure 6 
Kaplan-Meyer Survival Estimate
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Table 7: Duration Characteristics 
Category total mean min Median Max 
      
no. of subjects 7,330     
no. of records 7,330 1 1 1 1 
(first) entry time 0 0 0 0 
(final) exit time 54.368 1 47 856 
subjects with gap 0     
time on gap if gap 0     
time at risk 398,521 54.368 1 47 856 
      
failures 7,148 0.975 0 1 1 
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 From these results, we can see that the system is providing a relatively fast procedure for 
evaluating complaints, since the median duration is just 47 days for the system as a 
whole. 
If we look at our second question, we should now analyze the differences in duration 
among providers, and determine if these differences are important or not. First, let’s draw 
a survival function for each of the providers. Figure 7 shows the results we obtain by 
drawing a different survival function for each provider (Figure 2). From the simple 
inspection of Figure 7 we can see that there are two extreme providers, NAF with the 
lowest duration function, and WIPO with the highest duration function. The other 
providers are located somewhere in between these two extremes. It is interesting to notice 
that the two providers located at the extremes are the ones that polarize the number of 
complaints of the whole system. We should evaluate if these differences are significative 
and important. 
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 Figure 7 
Kaplan-Meyer Survival Estimate by Provider
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In order to determine the statistical differences among duration curves we use a set of 
tests designed to compare survival functions. The tests are the log-rank test, the Wilcoxon 
test and the Cox test. Table 8 shows the values for these tests, which corroborate that the 
duration functions between providers are statistically different. This result is very 
important, since we can conclude that there are differences in the structure and procedure 
of each or the providers in evaluating cases, which imply the possibility of forum 
shopping under the UDRP system. 
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 Table 8: Tests of Equality of Survival Curves 
Cox regression-based test 
Court Observed Expected Hazard 
NAF 2731 1740.85 1.674 
WIPO 4079 5110.42 0.830 
eRes 286 246.24 1.223 
CPR 52 50.48 1.081 
Total 7148 7148 1.000 
LR Chi2(4)=734.45               Prob. Chi2=0.000 
Log-rank test 
Court Observed Expected 
NAF 2731 1740.85 
WIPO 4079 5110.43 
eRes 286 246.24 
CPR 52 50.48 
Total 7148 7148 
Chi2(3)=834.61                                Prob. Chi2=0.0000 
Wilcoxon Test 
Court Observed Expected Sum of Ranks 
NAF 2731 1740.85 5440025 
WIPO 4079 5110.43 -5562113 
eRes 286 246.24 126492 
CPR 52 50.48 -4404 
Total 7148 7148 0 
Chi2(3)=1131.40                                Prob. Chi2=0.0000 
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 Furthermore, we can conclude that the duration function, and consequently the 
technology function, is different for each court. These differences could result in different 
results in decisions. In the next section we will analyze the factors that determine this 
difference in duration among providers. 
 
G. DURATION ANALYSIS BY COURT 
 In the previous section we showed that the duration functions for each court are 
different, and then they should be evaluated separately. In this section we will analyze the 
different factors behind the specific structure of each provider that determines a different 
duration function. Accordingly, we use a Cox semi-parametric duration model for the 
analysis of the cases in each court. As we showed before, this model will allow us to 
introduce independent variables to explain the differences in behavior in each provider, 
without imposing any specific structure on the hazard function. 
 In order to analyze the structure of each provider we utilize the database 
constructed by Mueller. This database contains more than 3000 cases compiled during 
2000-2001. There are many characteristics that have been collected and will be used in 
our analysis164. First, based on the different duration functions calculated in the previous 
section for each court, Table 9 shows the differences between each court in terms of 
duration based on the Kaplan-Meier estimator. As we showed before, WIPO is the 
provider with the most expected duration, with a mean duration of 57 days and a median 
of 51. The fastest provider is NAF with a mean duration of 38 days and a median of 35. 
This difference between the providers located at the extremes is very important, being 
close to twenty days, i.e. WIPO takes 48% more than the average time expected under 
NAF. 
                                                          
164 See Appendix C for a complete list of the variables used in this analysis. 
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 Table 9: Characteristics of Duration Functions for Each Provider 
WIPO CPR 
Category Total Mean Min Median Max Category Total Mean Min Median Max 
no. of subjects 1,999       no. of subjects 25       
no. of records 1,999 1 1 1 1 no. of records 25 1 1 1 1 
(first) entry time 0 0 0 0 (first) entry time 0 0 0 0 
(final) exit time 57.39 6 51 420 (final) exit time 46.32 20 43 72 
subjects with gap 0       subjects with gap 0       
time on gap if gap 0       time on gap if gap 0       
time at risk 114,719 57.39 6 51 420 time at risk 1158 46.32 20 43 72 
failures 1,999 1 1 1 1 Failures 25 1 1 1 1 
NAF eRes 
Category Total Mean Min Median Max Category Total Mean Min Median Max 
no. of subjects 1,123       no. of subjects 209       
no. of records 1,123 1 1 1 1 no. of records 209 1 1 1 1 
(first) entry time 0 1 1 1 (first) entry time 0 0 0 0 
(final) exit time 38.73 4 35 407 (final) exit time 47.84 20 44 130 
subjects with gap 0       subjects with gap 0       
time on gap if gap 0       time on gap if gap 0       
time at risk 43,489 38.73 4 35 407 time at risk 9999 47.84 20 44 130 
failures 1,123 1 1 1 1 Failures 209 1 1 1 1 
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In order to explain the differences among providers let’s look at the results from the Cox 
model. We tried all of the variables listed in the appendix B, and we found that the 
factors that best explain the behavior of each provider are the variables presented in Table 
10 that presents the results from the Cox model. First, we run a general model for each 
provider and tested for the fulfillment of the main assumption of the Cox model, i.e. the 
proportional hazard assumption165. From these tests we found that the variables for some 
of the panelists included in our models did not pass the proportional hazard tests. This is 
an important result, since it implies that for those judges the structure of the duration 
function is different than for the rest of the cases of the provider. We will analyze this 
result in more detail next. First, let’s look at the results for each provider presented in 
table 10. 
                                                          
165 See Appendix D for the complete presentation of the results. 
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Table 10: Cox Semi-Parametric Duration Model 
WIPO NAF CPR eRes 
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient 
Default 1.238 
(0.05767) 
Default 1.411 
(0.09149) 
  Default 1.914 
(0.29431) 
Split 0.530 
(0.08911) 
Respru 2.400 
(0.43334) 
Split 41.193 
(53.71631) 
Employee 2.608 
(0.68328) 
Respus 0.907 
(0.04657) 
Compde 2.069 
(1.0989) 
Ascomp 18.704 
(30.42342) 
Namecan 5.748 
(3.66312) 
Respse 1.650 
(0.34673) 
Compnac 3.908 
(1.76611) 
Asresp 4.418 
(2.229) 
Respciii 3.408 
(1.81084) 
Compus 0.882 
(0.04643) 
Complaw 1.106 
(0.04206) 
  Compca 0.739 
(0.10688) 
Compse 1.468 
(0.32872) 
      
Compin 0.679 
(0.10055) 
      
Compca 1.518 
(0.24300) 
      
Complaw 1.085 
(0.03865) 
      
Buchele, J. 1 Buchele, J. 2.640 
(0.40042) 
Buchele, J. 8.763 
(6.425) 
Buchele, J. 9.317 
(3.21267) 
Carmody, J. 1 Carmody, J. 1   Carmody, J. 14.829 
(4.83855) 
Dorf, P. 2.672 
(0.70459) 
      
Johnson, C. 1       
Kalina, H. 1 Kalina, H. 2.322 
(0.30927) 
    
Yachnin, R. 1 Yachnin, R. 1   Yachnin, R. 22.241 
(6.26071) 
Aimbury, A. 1.779 
(0.38403) 
      
Bernstein 0.684 
(0.08541) 
      
Nro 
Observations 
1996 
Nro Failures 1996 
Time at risk 114471 
Wald 
Chi2(df) 
135.8 
(df=12) 
Probability 
Chi2 
0.000 
Log 
Likelihood 
-12292.70 
1119 
1119 
43313 
156.61 
(df=7) 
0.000 
-6141.25 
25 
25 
1158 
11.46 
(df=4) 
0.0219 
-53.40 
209 
209 
9999 
154.87 
(df=8) 
0.000 
-884.87 
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In the case of WIPO the following variables have a positive impact on the duration 
function, implying a faster resolution of the cases, i.e. a lower probability of survival, are 
the following: Default, Respse, Compse, Compca, Complaw, Dorf, P., Limbury, A.. The 
variables that have a negative impact, implying longer time of resolution are, Split, 
Respus, Compus, Compin, Bernstein. In the case of Default and Split the explanation is 
straightforward. Default represents those complaints in which the respondent does not 
send and answer to the charges from the complainant. The positive sign implies that the 
panelists have less trouble in deciding fast these types of cases, which are generally 
decided in favor of the complainant. Split represents those cases in which the panel has a 
split decision concerning both parties. The negative impact on the duration is explained 
by the time needed by the panel to decide on the case. Usually split cases are of difficult 
resolution and then the panel spends more time on them. Complaw represents the number 
of proofs presented by the complainant in terms of the rules of the UDRP as listed by 
ICANN in the Article 4 of the policy. The positive sign for this variable means that as 
more proofs are presented by the complainant against the respondent, lower will be the 
time needed by the panel to decide the case. Again, in this case the explanation is 
straightforward. In the case of Respus and Compus, which are the variables that represent 
those cases in which respondent and complainant are from the United States. Because the 
effect of both variables is negative we can conclude that exist a negative bias with respect 
to claims or responses coming from the United States, in the sense that the panel takes 
more time in deciding those cases. Similarly the same effect is presented in the case of 
Compin, which represents complainants coming from India. On the other hand we have 
the case of Respse and Compse that represents cases in which the respondent or the 
claimant, or both, are from Switzerland. In this case the coefficient is positive, indicating 
that, in average, the panels of WIPO take less time to resolve this disputes having a 
positive bias toward Switzerland. It is interesting to notice that the geographical 
headquarters of WIPO are in Geneva, Switzerland. Hence, this effect could be related to a 
more comprehensive knowledge of laws and institutions of the country. Finally we 
observe the same effect in the case of Compca, which represents those claims in which 
the complainant is from Canada. The presence of these types of biases for a given 
country, even though they are positive or negative, are a general negative indicator for the 
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performance of the provider, because it implies that the provider is not up to the task of 
generating a universal and objective dispute resolution system for the Internet. 
Furthermore, this bias could generate problems in those cases that face parties in which 
one of them is from one of those countries. Finally, we have the effects of the specific 
panelists on the duration of the cases. As we can see, all of the panelists except one have 
a positive impact on the duration function, implying that these panelists, who are the ones 
that have received the higher number of cases across providers have certain independence 
on the way they proceed with the cases. Furthermore, for the case of WIPO, Panelists 
Buchele, Carmody, Johnson, Kalina and Yachnin not only have a positive impact on the 
duration function, but they do not have the same proportional hazard assumes for all the 
cases. This implies that these panelists do not follow the general procedure than the rest 
of the cases evaluated by WIPO. Figure 8 shows the differences in the duration function 
between these panelists and the rest of the cases. Figure 9 also shows the differences in 
hazard functions. Even though in all cases the hazard function seems to be exponential, 
meaning that the cases face an increasing probability of being solved, which is a good 
sign for the efficiency of WIPO, and this hazard is still higher in the case of the panelists 
under analysis. 
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Figure 8 
WIPO: Survival Functions by Judge
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Figure 9 
WIPO: Hazard Functions by Judge
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 Finally, Table 11 shows the different duration for each panelist under different 
probabilities of survival. As we can see the differences of results obtained between these 
panelists and the system as a whole is an indicator of the importance of the effect of 
specific panelists can have on the system. Accordingly, the selection procedure for the 
panelists, which is in the hands of the parties and the provider, is not innocuous. 
Furthermore, because the provider is the one in selecting the president of the panel, or in 
the case of sole panels, the arbitrator in charge, there differences between the panelists 
can have important implications for the result of the cases. Then we should see if the 
appointments of these panelists, who have a different procedure for analyzing the cases 
have an effect on the results observed. Table 12 shows the differences in types of cases 
received and verdicts reached by the judges that are significative different, the rest of the 
panelists and the whole system of the provider. As the t statistics show, there is no 
difference in the results between these panelists and the rest of the cases. As a result, it 
can be optimal for WIPO to rely in these panelists, who are faster than the rest, in order to 
improve the performance of the provider and attract more complainants. In the next 
section we will explore the performance of judges across providers. 
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 Table 11: WIPO, Duration for Each Panelist 
Probability of 
Survival 
All 
Cases Buchele, J. Carmody, J. Johnson, C. Kalina, H. Yachnin, R. 
0.9 38 28 29 34 30 24 
0.7 45 32 32 36 33 31 
0.5 53 38 37 40 35 34 
0.3 64 43 42 42 41 37 
0.1 87 60 55 54 48 43 
 
 
Table 12: WIPO Results of Cases by Type of Judges 
 Type of Respondent 
 Unaffili Licensee Competit Employee Criticor Unknown 
Bernstein 0.72 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 
Limbury, A. 0.76 0.03 0.17 0.03   
Yachnin, R. 0.75 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05  
Kalina, H. 0.92   0.08   
Johnson, C. 0.70 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.07 
Dorf, P. 0.88    0.04 0.08 
Carmody, J. 0.86  0.04 0.04  0.06 
Buchele, J. 0.75  0.08  0.04 0.13 
Tota Panelists 1l 0.78 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Abbot, F. 0.70 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.09 
Barker, L. 0.82 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Donahey, M. 0.78 0.02 0.12   0.08 
Samuels, J. 0.89  0.05   0.05 
Page, R. 0.72  0.15  0.05 0.08 
Foster, D. 0.78 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.03  
Bianchi, R. 0.69  0.14   0.17 
Total Panelists 2 0.77 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.07 
Rest of Cases 0.66 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.20 
T-Test Panelists1 vs Panelists2 0.9870 0.4790 -0.4510 - 0.9180 -1.8000 
Probability 0.3617 0.6792 0.6756  0.4557 0.2136 
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 Table 12 (Continuation) 
 Type of Response Panel Decision 
 Default Lateresp Transfer Dismiss Termin Namecan Split 
Bernstein 0.38  0.69 0.26 0.03  0.03 
Limbury, A. 0.41  0.69 0.28  0.03  
Yachnin, R. 0.50  0.80 0.20    
Kalina, H. 0.58  0.83 0.13   0.04 
Johnson, C. 0.40  0.69 0.28 0.01 0.01  
Dorf, P. 0.69  0.92 0.04   0.04 
Carmody, J. 0.57 0.02 0.90 0.10    
Buchele, J. 0.50  0.83 0.08 0.08   
Total Panelists 1 0.49 0.00 0.78 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Abbot, F. 0.40  0.70 0.30    
Barker, L. 0.40 0.02 0.71 0.24   0.04 
Donahey, M. 0.55  0.82 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Samuels, J. 0.47  0.84 0.16    
Page, R. 0.36 0.03 0.69 0.28 0.03   
Foster, D. 0.34 0.03 0.66 0.31   0.03 
Bianchi, R. 0.59  0.76 0.07 0.17   
Total Panelists 2 0.44 0.01 0.74 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.01 
Rest of Cases 0.43 0.01 0.67 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.01 
T-Test Panelists1 vs Panelists2 1.1500 - 1.1760 -0.5440 - - - 
Probability 0.2940  0.2843 0.6062    
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In the case of NAF, all of the variables have a positive impact on the Survival function, 
i.e. these variables decrease the expected duration of the cases. Similarly than in the 
previous case, Default has a positive effect, decreasing the duration of the review process. 
Complaw also has a positive impact on the duration of the procedure. With respect to the 
bias for certain complainants or responses coming from specific countries we have the 
following variables: Respru, Compde and Compnac. Respru is the variable that 
represents those respondents coming from Russia. Accordingly, for the responses coming 
from Russia, the provider has a lower time of resolution. Compde and Compnac are the 
variables for the complainants from Germany and North America. These complainants 
receive a faster resolution of their cases as compared with other complainants. In the case 
of North American complainants the bias could be the consequence of the geographical 
location of NAF, based in the United States, and the high proportion of panelists also 
from the United States. As mentioned before, this type of bias could be a problem to 
reach a homogeneous system of dispute resolution in the Internet. Finally, in the case of 
the panelists, there are fewer panelists that have specific duration functions, as compared 
with WIPO. Only two panelists, Carmody, J. and Yachnin, R. do not fit in the 
proportional hazard assumption of the general model. The survival and hazard functions 
for these two panelists are showed in Figures 10 and 11. As in the previous case, panelists 
are much faster in solving the cases than the rest of the judges for NAF. 
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Figure 10 
NAF: Survival Functions by Judges
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Figure 11 
NAF: Hazard Functions by Judges
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As we can see, the hazard functions are exponential, even though these functions are 
much steeper for both panelists. Table 13 shows the difference in duration for specific 
probabilities of failure. 
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 Table 13: NAF, Duration for Each Panelist 
Probability All Cases Carmody, J. Yachnin, R. 
0.9 30 25 23 
0.7 35 28 27 
0.5 39 31 30 
0.3 43 33 32 
0.1 59 40 35 
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As in the case of WIPO, we should analyze if the resulting verdicts of the panelists that 
are significative differ from other panelists and the system in general. Table 14 shows the 
corresponding data and the t statistics. As we can see, there is no major differences 
among panelists, except that in the case of the panelists that have a different hazard, 
received a higher number of cases in which the respondent was under default. 
Nonetheless, this effect has been controlled in the regression analysis. What is interesting 
is that the all the judges that managed an important number of cases have produced a 
higher proportion of verdicts favoring the complainant, as the variable Transfer is much 
higher for the panelist selected than for the rest of the cases. 
 85
 Table 14: NAF Results per Panelists 
 Type of Respondent 
 Unaffili Licensee Competit Employee Criticor Unknown 
Buchele, J. 0.74 0.05 0.16 0.02 0.02  0.02  
Carmody, J. 0.81 0.04 0.09 0.04   0.03  
Kalina, H. 0.73 0.03 0.18 0.03   0.03  
Yachnin, R. 0.86 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01  0.03  
Total Panelists 1 0.80 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.01  0.03  
Bernstein 0.89  0.11      
Bianchi, R. 0.84 0.05 0.05    0.05  
Foster, D. 0.65  0.29 0.06     
Limbury, A. 0.61 0.11 0.11 0.17     
Page, R. 0.90  0.10      
Samuels, J. 0.86 0.07 0.00  0.07    
Johnson, C. 0.63 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.04  0.02  
Dorf, P. 0.65 0.10 0.13 0.13     
Donahey, M. 0.60 0.10 0.10 0.10   0.10  
Barker, L. 0.65 0.04 0.22 0.09     
Abbot, F. 0.64 0.07 0.14 0.14    
Total Panelists 2 0.69 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.01  0.01  
Rest of Cases 0.58 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.02  0.18  
T test Panelists 1 and 2 0.9794 -0.9324 -0.1253 -1.4330 -0.1676 0.6169 
Probability 0.3453 0.3681 0.9022 0.1755 0.8695 0.5480 
 
Table 14 (Continuation) 
 Type of Response Type of Decision 
 Default Lateresp Transfer Dismiss Termin Namecan Split 
Juez 36 0.60  0.00 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Carmody, J. 0.73  0.00 0.93 0.06 0.01 0.00  0.00 
Kalina, H. 0.52  0.03 0.76 0.24 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Yachnin, R. 0.71  0.01 0.90 0.07 0.03 0.00  0.00 
Total Panelists1 0.67  0.01 0.89 0.10 0.01 0.00  0.00 
Bernstein 0.44  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Bianchi, R. 0.58  0.00 0.89 0.05 0.05 0.00  0.00 
Foster, D. 0.47  0.00 0.82 0.18 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Limbury, A. 0.50  0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Page, R. 0.60  0.00 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Samuels, J. 0.57  0.00 0.79 0.14 0.00 0.07  0.00 
Johnson, C. 0.40  0.00 0.71 0.27 0.00 0.02  0.00 
Dorf, P. 0.52  0.00 0.77 0.19 0.00 0.03  0.00 
Donahey, M. 0.30  0.00 0.80 0.10 0.10 0.00  0.00 
Barker, L. 0.57  0.00 0.87 0.13 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Abbot, F. 0.64  0.00 0.64 0.21 0.00 0.14  0.00 
Total Panelists 2 0.50  0.00 0.80 0.17 0.01 0.02  0.00 
Rest of Cases 0.38  0.00 0.64 0.17 0.17 0.01  0.01 
T test Panelists 1 and 2 2.2583  0.7457 -2559.0000 -0.2553   
Probability 0.0418  0.4691 0.8020 0.8025   
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In the CPR case all the variables have a positive impact on the duration function reducing 
the expected time of the cases being evaluated. It is strange that the cases in which the 
panel has a divided opinion, Split, the sign of the coefficient is positive, since we should 
expect that the cases in which a split decision is reached should be the more difficult to 
decide. Furthermore, this is the only factor, among the different characteristics of the 
cases and the proofs presented, that has an impact on the duration of the cases. Ascomp 
and Asresp have both positive sign, implying a faster resolution for cases in which the 
respondent and/or the complainant come from Asia. This is the geographical bias for this 
provider. Finally, there is only one panelist that has a positive impact on the duration 
function, Buchele, J.. Nonetheless, this panelist stays within the same proportional hazard 
function than the rest of the cases for the Provider. Figures 12 and 13 depict the survival 
and hazard functions for CPP. As we can see, the hazard function is exponential, meaning 
that cases face an increasing rate of being solved. 
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 Figure 12 
CPR Survival Function
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Figure 13 
CPR Hazard Function
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For the case of eRes all of the variables have a positive sign except for Compcan. As 
expected, Default has a positive effect reducing the time of duration for the cases. 
Employee, which represents those cases in which the respondent is an employee of the 
complainant, has a positive sign implying a faster rate of resolution for those cases. As 
for variables representing the final decision of the panel we have that those cases in 
which the panel decided that the name should be changed have been solved more rapidly. 
With respect to the proofs presented in each case, this provider was especially fast in the 
cases in which the respondent presented proof of its rights over the domain name, 
Respciii. This could be proof of a general bias of eRes in favor of respondents, as 
contrasted with WIPO and NAF, whose systems were more sensible to the presentation 
of proofs by the complainants. As for geographical bias, the variable Compca, which 
represents those claims in which the complainant is from Canada, has a negative sign 
implying a higher time of duration. This bias means that the panel of eRes devoted mrote 
time in analyzing complaints coming from Canada. Not surprisingly, eRes headquarters 
were geographically located in Quebec, Canada. As for the panelists, three of them had a 
positive sign decreasing the expected time of duration. Nonetheless, none of these 
variables violate the assumption of a proportional hazard function. Figures 14 and 15 
shows the survival and hazard functions for eRes. 
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 Figure 14 
eRes: Survival Function
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Figure 15 
eRes: Hazard Function
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 1.  Panelist across Providers 
 
According to our previous analysis, some panelists have an important influence on the 
performance of the providers, and even some of them perform totally independently from 
the other cases evaluated at the provider166. In order to see if these panelists behave in 
similar fashion regardless the provider they are working for, in this section we evaluate 
the performance of these panelists across providers. If panelists have a similar duration 
function regardless of the provider they are working for, then they are totally 
independent, and the institutional structure of the provider did not influence their 
activities. On the other hand, if we found that these panelists act differently for different 
providers, then the institutional arrangement of the different providers become very 
important to determine the procedure and, in the end, the efficiency and speed of the 
system as a whole. In this case, we have that the differences among providers matter for 
the performance of the system. For our analysis we have four panelists that received 
cases from almost two providers, Buchele, J. Kalina, H., Carmody, J. and Yachnin, R. 
Figure 16 compares the Survival function for each of these panelists in the different 
providers. As we can see, in most of the cases there are notable differences in the survival 
functions. 
                                                          
166 “In some UDRP cases, arbitration panelists may ignore critical aspects of the policy, define the criteria 
in the UDRP so broadly that they become meaningless. Some level variation among individual arbitrators 
based on their experience, their views of trademark laws and varying interpretations of the facts should be 
expected.” Brooks, supra note 5, at 323. 
 91
 Figure 16 
Survival Function Judge36
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 These differences can better be seen in Table 15, which shows the duration time for 
different probabilities of survival. As we can appreciate, as the case stays more in the 
hands of a given panelist, the duration time increases in one of the providers with respect 
to the other. From this table we can conclude that NAF has a better designed mechanism 
to handle claims fast. Accordingly, the same panelists are faster in NAF than they are in 
WIPO167. 
 
 
 
                                                          
167 If we take each panelists and run a Cox proportional model we find that one of the most important 
variables that explain the duration is the provider under which the panelist is analyzing the claim. 
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 Table 15: Comparison of Panelists Across Providers 
 Buchele, J. Carmody, J. Kalina, H. Yachnin, R. 
Probability WIPO NAF Diff. WIPO NAF Diff. WIPO NAF Diff. WIPO NAF Diff. 
0.9 28 27 1 29 25 4 30 27 3 24 23 1 
0.7 32 29 3 32 28 4 33 30 3 31 28 3 
0.5 38 31 7 38 31 7 35 33 2 34 30 4 
0.3 43 33 10 42 33 9 41 35 6 37 32 5 
0.1 50 38 12 55 40 15 48 39 9 43 35 8 
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 2. Default 
 One of the main characteristics of the UDRP system is the high number of 
respondents that are in default, that is they do not send their response to the provider and 
fail to defend themselves from the claims of the complainants. As a result, in these cases 
it is easier for the panel to give a verdict favoring the complainant. Furthermore, the 
absence of documentation from the respondent challenging the complainant allegations 
make easier for the panelists to evaluate such cases. As a consequence, we found that the 
duration in these cases are much lower than for the other ones. In all of the regressions, 
except for CPR, the cases in default were an important explanatory factor for the duration 
function of the respective provider. In this section we want to analyze if the fact that a 
given case is in default gives different duration depending on the provider we are 
considering. This analysis will give us further proofs of fundamental structural 
differences among providers. Table 16 shows the expected duration of cases in which the 
respondent is in default, for the different probabilities of survival. 
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 Table 16: Cases in Default Across Providers 
Probability WIPO NAF eRes 
Dif WIPO-
NAF Dif WIPO-eRes Dif eRes-NAF Percentage Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)=(1)-(2) (5=(1)-(3) (6)=(3)-(2) (4)/(1) (5)/(1) (6)/(3) 
0.9 36 26 30 10 6 4 27.8 16.7 13.3 
0.7 42 30 37 12 5 7 28.6 11.9 18.9 
0.5 48 33 40 15 8 7 31.3 16.7 17.5 
0.3 57 37 46 20 11 9 35.1 19.3 19.6 
0.1 76 42 56 34 20 14 44.7 26.3 25.0 
Cases that are not in Default 
Probability WIPO NAF eRes Dif WIPO-NAF Dif WIPO-eRes Dif eRes-NAF Percentage Difference 
0.9 36 27 34 9 2 7 25.0 5.6 20.6 
0.7 44 34 41 10 3 7 22.7 6.8 17.1 
0.5 53 37 45 16 8 8 30.2 15.1 17.8 
0.3 64 42 55 22 9 13 34.4 14.1 23.6 
0.1 92 55 71 37 21 16 40.2 22.8 22.5 
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 As we can see, NAF is still faster than WIPO and eRes, and eRes is faster than WIPO. As 
the probability of survival decreases, the difference in expected duration increases 
between NAF and WIPO, NAF and eRes and eRes and WIPO. Accordingly, this result 
reinforces our previous analysis and conclusions that the providers have structural 
differences among them. 
 
3. Type of Panels 
 One of the main issues that surrounds the debate about the UDRP is the type of 
panels that should be put in place. Currently there are two types of panels, single member 
panel or three member panel. According to Geist, the bias of the UDRP in favor of 
complainants could be solved by simply changing to a general three member panel 
system, abandoning the one member panel. In this section we would like to evaluate the 
efficiency implications of such a change, i.e. which is the impact of having three member 
panels in the UDRP system, with respect to the duration of the process. Accordingly, we 
test the duration function, using a Kaplan-Meyer estimator for those cases with three 
member panels as compared with those with just one member. Figure 17 shows both 
duration functions. 
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 Figure 17 
Survival Function by Type of Panel
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 As we can appreciate, there is almost no change between the duration curves, and the 
duration time for the three member panels seems to be slightly above the one of the single 
member panel. Table 17 shows the log-normal and Cox tests of survival functions. 
According with these tests, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that both duration 
functions are the same. 
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 Table 17: Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions 
 Events 
Type p Observed Expected 
0 271 293.68 
1 2681 2658.32 
Total 2952 2952 
chi2(1) =       2.04 
Pr>chi2 =     0.1527 
Cox regression-based test for equality of survival curves 
Events Relative 
Type p Observed Expected Hazard 
0 29 293.68 0.9228 
1 26 2658.32 1.0089 
Total 2952 2952 1 
LR chi2(1) =       2.00 
Pr>chi2 =     0.1573 
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As a result, changing from the actual system to one in which only three member panels 
are allowed would not imply a decline in the duration time, and then in the efficiency of 
the UDRP system, having a good impact improving the fairness of the system. 
 
 
VI. RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 From the regression analysis in the previous sections we can draw several general 
characteristics for the UDRP system. First, the system is not as homogeneous as ICANN 
has been telling everybody. Even though the Providers have the same rules for every case 
and they cannot depart from this general policy, our duration model shows that the 
providers have a totally different technology function that induce different performance 
in terms of expected duration for each case. Accordingly, these differences give place to 
the possibility of forum shopping for complainants. This possibility is reinforced by the 
fact that the two most popular Providers are located at the extremes of the technological 
diversity, polarizing the supply of dispute resolution services. Other minor providers, 
who get some marginal cases, are located somewhere in between. The different 
performance is also reinforced by the different factors and variables that determine the 
different behavior between these providers. As a result, given these variables that affect 
the general performance, complainants will chose the provider according to their 
idiosyncratic characteristics that can influence on the decision. 
 The solution of these extreme differences between providers can be solved by 
further standardization of the general procedure for handling and deciding the claims. For 
example, the extra fees that NAF provides in order to generate incentive to promote short 
responses and complaints and to reduce the total length of the case could be extended as a 
general rule for all providers in order to generate the right incentives across providers. On 
the other hand, if the system is let as it is before, the market demand for low duration for 
cases could drive down the number of cases of WIPO with respect to NAF, as it has been 
happening in the last year, and then to induce WIPO to improve its performance. 
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Furthermore, the lengthy procedure of WIPO does not generate many differences in 
terms of verdict, since the results of the cases presented in both providers are similar. 
 Second, the case characteristics that determine the performance of each provider 
are similar. Those cases in which the respondent is in default have a direct consequence 
in reducing the general duration of the case. Nonetheless, as explained before, this 
duration is not the same for all providers, supporting the claim that the providers are 
structurally different. The number and quality of the proofs presented by the 
complainants and respondents have an impact on the performance of the providers. It is 
interesting to notice that WIPO and NAF, which have been accused of favoring 
complainants, are the ones affected by the proofs presented by the complainants. On the 
other hand, eRes, which has been recognized as being more favorable to respondents, is 
strongly affected by the proofs presented by the respondents. The results obtained with 
respect to the law are important, in the sense that the providers are paying attention to the 
compliance of complainants and providers with the general rules established by ICANN, 
and that this compliance determines the performance of the providers. Finally, WIPO and 
CPR procedure is influenced by those cases in which the decision is split. However, the 
results are different for both providers, being more consistent with what is expected in 
those cases for CPR, i.e. the cases in which the panel could not take a definitive decision 
should be more difficult to solve and it should take longer to solve. In the case of eRes 
there are other two factors that affected the duration. First, if the respondent was an 
employee of the complainant the cases were solved faster. Second, in those cases in 
which the panel decided to change the domain name, the duration was also lower. These 
two effect are difficult to explain in terms of incentives of the provider, and they can 
obey to some idiosyncratic characteristics of the provider. 
 Third, even though the system has been designed for the Internet in order to avoid 
geographical biases, the UDRP providers are still subject to the influence of such factors. 
In the case of WIPO, there is a bias with respect to the United States, Canada, India and 
Switzerland. For NAF the bias is with respect to Germany, North America (United States 
principally) and Russia. CPR has a bias for Asian complainants and respondents. Finally, 
eRes have a bias for those cases in which the complainant is from Canada. The bias of 
each provider can respond to different causes. WIPO headquarters are located in 
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Switzerland, a fact that can explain the bias for parties from this country. NAF is located 
in the United States and it is biased with respect to North American complainants. CPR is 
taking a bias for Asian complainants and respondents. Finally, eRes headquarters were in 
Quebec, Canada, which explains the bias with respect to Canadian complainants. 
Accordingly, each of the main providers is heavily affected by the place in which it is 
located. This characteristic is a problem for a system that attempts to be global and 
ubiquitous as the Internet. Geographical biases indicate that the system could be ill 
equipped to handle cases coming from places in which the rules and institutions are 
different from the location of the provider. Furthermore, this bias could be prejudicial for 
complainants or respondents that are facing a case against a party coming from one of the 
countries in which the provider has a bias. The solution for this problem is not easy since 
the diversity of the panelists do not necessarily improves the situation. For example, 
WIPO is the provider with best diversity of panelists. However it is the provider with bias 
for a higher number of countries. It could be that the introduction of new regional 
providers, as it is the case of the new Asian provider could be a solution to this problem. 
Accordingly, the creation of regional providers could decrease the bias for some 
countries and improve the efficiency of the system. Nonetheless, some rules and 
procedures should be provided for cases in which parties are from diverse regions. 
 Fourth, some panelists depart from the general performance of the other cases 
managed by the provider. This could be a problem, in the case that these panelists had a 
behavior completely different from other panelists that received an important number of 
cases. Nonetheless, as analyzed in the previous section, the panelists that have a different 
behavior in terms of performance do not have a significative effect on the results of the 
system. Accordingly, the providers are improving efficiency by favoring these panelists 
in giving them more cases to solve. However, there are some differences of the panelists 
that received a high number of claims and the rest of the cases. We can see a bias 
favoring the complainants, which has already been noticed by other researchers and 
commentators. Finally, we showed that, even though some panelists have a different 
performance than the providers they are working for, they are affected by the structure of 
the providers, since their behavior is different depending on the provider they are in. In 
this respect the system could be improved in efficiency by identifying the characteristics 
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of these panelists that make them different, and faster, than the rest of the system. These 
characteristics could be embedded in the rules and procedures of the providers, 
improving the efficiency of the system as a whole. 
 Finally, we analyzed the differences in performance between single member and 
three member panels. As we show, three member panels are equally efficient than single 
member panel. Accordingly, to change from a single member to a general three member 
panel should not have a negative impact on the expected duration of the cases. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The UDRP regime of ICANN has been subject to several analyses from scholars 
and commentators. Most of these studies concentrate on the general empirical results of 
the system. Employing different perspectives, these studies generally criticize the UDRP 
providers as being biased towards complainants and leaving the respondents without a 
fair defense of their rights. In this work, we show that the emphasis of the different 
empirical studies on the bias problem has been also “biased”. As we have shown, the 
supposed bias of the providers towards the complainants is not the main variable the 
complainants are looking at in order to decide the most suitable provider of domain name 
dispute resolution services. Instead, complainants seem to regard the performance of the 
providers as the main variable to be taken into account at the moment of deciding the 
provider. From this result, we can conclude that the literature should pay more attention 
to the relative performance of the providers. Accordingly, the procedural rules should be 
analyzed, not just in terms of bias and fairness, which has been overdone in the recent 
literature, but in terms of the incentives it generates for the rapid and efficient solution of 
the claims presented under the UDRP policy. A better understanding of the UDRP could 
be possible by paying more attention to efficiency and performance indicators from 
providers and panelists. 
 Based on our findings about the importance of the performance of the UDRP, we 
analyze the procedural structure of each provider. We identify the duration of the 
procedure as the main indicator of the efficiency of the system. Accordingly, we use 
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duration models to identify the different factors that have an influence in determining the 
performance of each provider. As we have shown, even though the providers are taking 
into account important factors, such as proofs provided by the parties, there are still 
remaining problems that could be solved in order to improve the global performance of 
the system. First, the providers have different technologies for solving cases, providing 
room for forum shopping. Despite the attempts by ICANN to provide uniform rules and 
policies, the providers still have differences among them that can be exploited. In general, 
we found that the NAF is the most efficient provider, while WIPO is the least efficient. 
The other providers rank somewhere between these two extremes. Second, panelists are 
important. Some panelists have totally different performance functions from the 
providers they are working for. However, these differences are affected by the specific 
rules of each provider. Accordingly, the existence of these different panelists could 
improve efficiency if it is demonstrated that they are faster than the rest, as we found in 
the case of WIPO. But it could be a bad sign, if these panelists are producing results that 
are biased with respect to the rest of the cases being handled by the provider, as we found 
in the case of NAF. Third, the UDRP is supposed to avoid geographical discrimination 
and biases by designing general rules for the Internet, suggesting that we should not find 
any discrimination favoring or disfavoring some country or region. However, we found 
that the UDRP providers are geographically biased. Specifically, they are more 
efficiently handling cases from the places where their headquarters are located. This bias 
could have important implications for handling inter-jurisdictional cases. As a result, the 
split of the UDRP into regions could be desirable if this bias is not eliminated in the 
medium term. Finally, we found that the election of a single or three member panel has 
no effects on the performance of the system. 
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VIII. APPENDIX A 
 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy168
 
a. Applicable Disputes. You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event that a third 
party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of Procedure, that 
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has 
rights; and 
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and 
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. 
In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of these three elements are present. 
b. Evidence of Registration and Use in Bad Faith. For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii), the following 
circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the 
registration and use of a domain name in bad faith: 
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose 
of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the 
trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your 
documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or 
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting 
the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or 
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or 
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your 
web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, 
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or 
location. 
c. How to Demonstrate Your Rights to and Legitimate Interests in the Domain Name in Responding to a 
Complaint. When you receive a complaint, you should refer to Paragraph 5 of the Rules of Procedure in determining 
how your response should be prepared. Any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if 
found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate your rights or 
legitimate interests to the domain name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii): 
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name 
corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or 
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly known by the domain name, even if 
you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or 
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to 
misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue. 
 
                                                          
168 At, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm  
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IX. APPENDIX B 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Cmwipo 6907 0.695196 0.058988 0.556604 0.78 
Cmeres 3207 0.598404 0.208998 0.25 1 
Ldwipo 6907 4.031995 0.16402 3.367296 4.304384 
Lderes 3042 3.981898 0.230907 3.684704 4.584968 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Cmnafl 6801 0.74789 0.070263 0.553846 0.9 
Cmwipol 6801 0.692952 0.05711 0.556604 0.78 
Cmeresl 3077 0.575869 0.191426 0.25 1 
Ldnafl 6801 3.718587 0.14358 3.328627 4.044888 
Ldwipol 6801 4.026402 0.183573 3.367296 4.304384 
Lderesl 3077 3.983243 0.228455 3.684704 4.584968 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Cwipo 6874 0.697 0.028 0.583 1.000 
Ldunaf 6907.000 3.657 0.063 3.234 3.765 
Lduwipo 6874.000 3.953 0.157 3.308 4.086 
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X. APPENDIX C 
Variables Mueller Database 
 Variable Description 
Dependent Variable Duration Duration, in days, of each case 
Unaffiliated No relationship with the complainant 
Licensee Respondent is licensee of the Complainant 
Competitor Respondent is competitor 
Employee Respondent is an employee 
Critic Respondent is a critic 
Type of Respondent 
Unknown The status of the respondent is unknown 
Default The respondent fails to answer to the Provider Type of Response 
Lat Response Respondent is late in his/her response 
Transfer Decision favorable to complainant 
Dismiss The complaint is dismissed, favorable to respondent 
Terminated The complaint is terminated, without clear result (maybe there is a private agreement or a court action) 
Name Change The panel forces one of the parties to change the name of the domain. 
Panel Decision 
Split The decision favored the complainant in some aspects and the respondent in others. 
 Judicial Panelists have reviewed other judicial cases from other courts in the countries of the parties 
RespUS (CompUS) Respondent (Complainant) from the United States 
RespFR (CompFR) Respondent (Complainant) from the United States 
ResAU (CompAU) Respondent (Complainant) from Australia 
ResMX (CompMX) Respondent (Complainant) from Mexico 
ResSE (CompSE) Respondent (Complainant) from the Switzerland 
ResIN (CompIN) Respondent (Complainant) from India 
ResCA (CompCA) Respondent (Complainant) from Canada 
ResNZ (CompNZ) Respondent (Complainant) from New Zealand 
ResGB (CompGB) Respondent (Complainant) from Great Britain 
ResJP (CompJP) Respondent (Complainant) from Japan 
ResBE (CompBE) Respondent (Complainant) from Belgium 
ResDE (CompDE) Respondent (Complainant) from Germany 
ResIT (CompIT) Respondent (Complainant) from Italy 
ResES (CompES) Respondent (Complainant) from Spain 
ResNL (CompNL) Respondent (Complainant) from Netherlands 
ResRU (CompRU) Respondent (Complainant) from Russia 
ResCH (CompCH) Respondent (Complainant) from Check Republic 
ResME (CompME) Respondent (Complainant) from Middle East 
ResNAC (CompNAC) Respondent (Complainant) from North America 
ResSA (CompSA) Respondent (Complainant) from South America 
ResOC (CompOC) Respondent (Complainant) from Oceania 
ResAS (CompAS) Respondent (Complainant) from Asia 
ResEU (CompEU) Respondent (Complainant) from Europe 
Country of Respondents 
(Complainants) 
ResAF (CompAF) Respondent (Complainant) from Africa 
Rule 4a(i) Evidence on the Articles of the ICANN policy, see appendix A. 
Rule 4a(ii)  
Rule 4a(iii)  
Rule 4c(i)  
Rule 4c(ii)  
Rule 4c(iii)  
Rule 4b(i)  
Rule 4b(ii)  
ICANN Policy Articles 
Rule 4b(iii)  
 Panel Type If the panel is single member or a three member panel 
Panelist1 Abbot, F. 
Panelist 19 Barker, L. 
Panelist 36 Buchele, J. 
Panelist 41 Carmody, J. 
Panelist 63 Donahey, M 
Panelist 64 Dorf, P. 
Panelist 113 Johnson, C. 
Panelist 114 Kalina, H. 
Panelist 217 Yachnin, R. 
Panelist 180 Samuels, J. 
Panelist 162 Page, R. 
Panelist 134 Limbury, A. 
Panelist 79 Foster, D. 
Panelist 27 Bianchi, R. 
Panelists 
Panelist 24 Bernstein 
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XI. APPENDIX D 
 
Cox Semi-Parametric Duration Model without Stratification 
WIPO NAF 
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient 
Default 1.234 
(0.05748) 
Default 1.355 
(0.08893) 
Split 0.556 
(0.12954) 
Respru 2.565 
(0.78246) 
Respus 0.898 
(0.04594) 
Compde 2.479 
(1.76767) 
Respse 1.703 
(0.35442) 
Compnac 3.500 
(2.02836) 
Compus 0.892 
(0.04641) 
Complaw 1.117 
(0.04553) 
Compse 1.601 
(0.30560) 
  
Compin 0.693 
(0.11144) 
  
Compca 1.542 
(0.26687) 
  
Complaw 1.076 
(0.04162) 
  
Buchele, J. 3.523 
(0.76310) 
Buchele, J. 2.640 
(0.40042) 
Carmody, J. 3.666 
(0.53735) 
Carmody, J. 2.970 
(0.313959) 
Dorf, P. 2.583 
(0.51499) 
  
Johnson, C. 3.310 
(0.41969) 
  
Kalina, H. 3.068 
(0.63650) 
Kalina, H. 2.135 
(0.38243) 
Yachnin, R. 4.829 
(1.10124) 
Yachnin, R. 3.124 
(0.417072) 
Limbury, A. 1.756 
(0.33117) 
  
Bernstein 0.690 
(0.11368) 
  
Nro Observations 1996 
Nro Failures 1996 
Time at risk 114471 
Wald Chi2(df) 135.8 
(df=12) 
Probability Chi2 0.000 
Log Likelihood -12292.70 
1119 
1119 
43313 
156.61 
(df=7) 
0.000 
-6141.25 
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Test of Proportional Hazards Assumption 
WIPO NAF eRes CPR 
 Rho Chi2 Prob  Rho Chi2 Prob  Rho Chi2 Prob  Rho Chi2 Prob 
Default 0.038 2.97 0.088 Default -0.013 0.20 0.652 Default 0.005 0.00 0.946 Split 0.071 0.32 0.574 
Split 0.014 0.40 0.527 Respru 0.012 0.17 0.682 Employee -0.080 1.49 0.223 Ascomp 0.059 0.19 0.661 
Respus 0.001 0.00 0.955 Compde 0.018 0.37 0.541 Namecan -0.015 0.04 0.846 Asresp 0.096 0.30 0.582 
Respse 0.017 0.51 0.474 Compnac -0.006 0.04 0.842 Respciii -0.022 0.11 0.744     
Compus -0.004 0.04 0.842 Complaw -0.027 0.88 0.348 Compca 0.079 1.09 0.296     
Compse -0.020 0.74 0.389             
Compin 0.014 0.39 0.533             
Compca -0.007 0.08 0.772             
Complaw -0.007 0.12 0.732             
Buchele, J. -0.037 2.71 0.099 Buchele, 
J. 
-0.017 0.31 0.577 Buchele, 
J. 
-0.002 0.00 0.987 Buchele, 
J. 
0.089 0.36 0.549 
Carmody, J. -0.064 8.12 0.004 Carmody, 
J. 
-0.134 19.28 0.000 Carmody, 
J. 
-0.001 0.00 0.993     
Dorf, P. -0.031 1.96 0.161             
Johnson, C. -0.062 7.64 0.006             
Kalina, H. -0.116 27.17 0.000 Kalina, H. 0.016 0.30 0.582         
Yachnin, R. -0.101 20.41 0.000 Yachnin, 
R. 
-0.232 62.48 0.000 Yachnin, 
R. 
-0.028 0.07 0.793     
Limbury, A. -0.017 0.58 0.447             
Bernstein 0.027 1.47 0.225             
Global test  68.32 0.000   83.24 0.000   2.45 0.964  0.40  0.983 
 
 
Test of Proportional Hazards Assumption, Stratified Models 
WIPO NAF 
 Rho Chi2 Prob  Rho Chi2 Prob 
Default 0.032 2.10 0.147 Default -0.010 0.10 0.747 
Split 0.025 0.73 0.394 Respru 0.015 0.09 0.771 
Respus -0.001 0.00 0.948 Compde 0.011 0.07 0.794 
Respse 0.018 0.65 0.419 Compnac 0.001 0.00 0.980 
Compus -0.002 0.01 0.937 Complaw -0.025 0.63 0.429 
Compse -0.024 1.49 0.222     
Compin 0.017 0.48 0.488     
Compca -0.005 0.04 0.839     
Complaw -0.005 0.04 0.839     
Buchele, J.    Buchele, J. -0.009 0.11 0.743 
Carmody, J.    Carmody, J.    
Dorf, P. -0.030 3.19 0.074     
Johnson, C.        
Kalina, H.    Kalina, H. 0.027 0.44 0.507 
Yachnin, R.    Yachnin, R.    
Limbury, A. -0.016 0.69 0.406     
Bernstein 0.029 0.98 0.321     
Global test  9.06 0.939   1.69 0.996 
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WIPO: Cox-Snell Residuals Test of Fit
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NAF: Cox-Snell Residuals Test of Fit
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CPR: Cox-Snell Residuals Test of Fit 
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eRes: Cox-Snell Test of Fit
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